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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules recently proposed 
that the Supreme Court and Congress amend Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11. 1 The Rule, as revised in 1983, has been the most con-
1. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that 
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the 
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is 
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose. . . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is 
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, 
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an 
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or 
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the 
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The Advisory Committee is a 12-member body comprised of federal 
judges, law professors, and practitioners, which Congress has authorized to study the Federal 
Rules and to formulate proposals for change as indicated. See Harold S. Lewis, The Excessive 
History of Federal Rule J 5(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1507 
(1987); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Poli-
tics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 796, 797 n.2 (1991). 
The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference (Standing 
Committee) is a similarly constituted entity that must approve Advisory Committee proposals 
before they proceed to subsequent approval stages. In July, 1991, the Standing Committee 
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troversial amendment in the half-century history of the Federal Rules. 
Judges have inconsistently applied the 1983 revision, and it has engen-
dered much expensive satellite litigation. Considerable evidence sug-
gests that Rule 11 activity has chilled civil rights plaintiffs and 
attorneys. These difficulties led the Advisory Committee to initiate a 
study of the Rule in August of 1990, to solicit written public com-
ments on its operation which were due that November, and to hold a 
public hearing on the Rule in February of 1991. 
The Committee's decision to recommend changes in Rule 11 is 
important for many reasons. The Rule's language, its judicial imple-
mentation, and its invocation by lawyers and litigants have been 
extremely controversial. Rule 11 has sparked intense debate among 
the bench, the bar, and writers and has prompted five major studies of 
its implementation. Judges have issued approximately 2,000 reported 
opinions, thousands of unreported determinations, and many addi-
tional unpublished decisions. There has also been much informal 
Rule 11 activity. Indeed, the Rule's influence is so pervasive that fed-
eral court practitioners ignore it at their peril. 
The amendment process also is significant because the Advisory 
Committee's proposal is certain to provoke lively debate. Moreover, 
reexamination of Rule 11 is one of the first experiments with the new 
rule revision procedures that Congress prescribed in 1988 to enhance 
public scrutiny of the process. The Committee deliberations warrant 
documentation because its "intent" in recommending modification 
will inform application of the amendment that the Supreme Court 
and Congress promulgate. 2 It is important, therefore, to evaluate the 
suggestions for change and the decisional processes underlying them. 
This Article undertakes that effort. 
Part II examines the developments that led the Advisory Com-
mittee to reconsider Rule 11 and the public responses to its Call for 
Comments on the Rule. Part III descriptively analyzes the specific 
changes that the Committee recommended, provides the rationales 
authorized the Advisory Committee to seek public comment on its proposal. Because the 
proposal included only minor changes and the Advisory Committee's original proposal should 
closely resemble the Rule ultimately promulgated, that Committee's work is the focus of this 
Article. 
2. I recognize that inescapable limitations restrict any effort to document the intent of a 
12-person drafting committee whose members each expressed views with varying clarity. See 
Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 498-
99, 508 (1986). It is important, however, to document what was said and to attempt to capture 
what was intended in the seven hours of Committee discussion. By watching the deliberations, 
I was able to witness certain subtleties and inflections and, thereby, gain insights into the rule 
revisors' thinking that are otherwise unavailable, even to one who listens to the tape recordings 
of the meeting. · 
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afforded for them, and evaluates their implications. This Part next 
assesses the proposal in light of the problems that the current Rule 
has posed for judges, attorneys, and parties since the 1983 revision. 
The proposal's responsiveness remains unclear in part because its effi-
cacy depends on the courts' exercise of their discretion in implement-
ing new Rule 11. 
Part IV provides suggestions for the future. It finds that the sig-
nificant complications which existing Rule 11 has presented, uncer-
tainty whether the proposal will ameliorate them, and the new 
problems that it will create warrant greater change than the Commit-
tee has recommended. Those with rule-amending responsibility, 
therefore, should seriously consider rejecting the proposal or revising 
it more substantially. If the rule revisors disagree with these sugges-
tions, however, they should follow the recommendations for change 
in particular parts of the proposal when adopting a new version of 
Rule 11. 
II. DEVELOPMENTS THAT PRECEDED THE PROPOSAL 
A. Rule ll's 1983 Amendment 
In the mid-l 970s, the federal courts experienced a "litigation 
explosion. "3 Several judges and a few writers asserted that the civil 
caseload was increasing dramatically and that many of these lawsuits, 
especially civil rights cases, lacked merit.4 Some judges and commen-
tators believed that the 1938 Federal Rules permitted parties and 
attorneys to abuse the litigation process by, for example, manipulating 
procedural provisions for tactical advantage. s 
Most of the contentions were controversial then and remain so. 6 
3. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic 
Anticipation, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23 
(A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 287-96 (1989); see also D. Michael 
Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. l, 4 (1976) (discussing pre-1975 history of Rule 
11). 
4. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); Jones v. Community 
Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 
920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976); Thomas B. Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and Future Trends, 11 
JumcATURE 151 (1987). But see Rotolo, 532 F.2d at 927 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Theodore 
Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 641, 642-43 (1987). 
5. Judges and writers were especially critical of flexible pleading and discovery. See 
Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 440-43 (1986); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or 
Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1984). 
6. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 288-89 (discussing pertinent literature and efforts to 
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Notwithstanding these complications and a paucity of applicable 
data, the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court suggested Rule 
11 's substantial revision as one response to litigation abuse. 7 Congress 
agreed, and amended Rule 11 became effective in August 1983. 8 The 
revised Rule required courts to sanction litigants and practitioners 
who fail to conduct reasonable legal or factual inquiries before filing 
papers and those who submit such papers for improper purposes.9 
The drafters intended to overcome the reluctance both of parties and 
lawyers to invoke original Rule 11 and of judges to sanction. Such 
reticence had allowed the provision to lapse into disuse. 10 
B. Activity Under Revised Rule 11 
1. DISADVANTAGEOUS ACTIVITY DURING THE 
INITIAL HALF-DECADE 
From the time that the amended Rule took effect in August 1983 
until approximately 1988, Rule 11 had an adverse effect on many par-
ties and attorneys, especially civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel. 11 
Civil rights plaintiffs had sanctions motions filed, and granted, against 
them more often than any other type of federal court litigant. 12 Many 
judges vigorously applied Rule 11 's reasonable prefiling inquiry 
requirements against civil rights plaintiffs, 13 and some judges imposed 
resolve some of the controversy); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. 
REV. 485, 522-23 (1988-89) (same). There is little consensus about what constitutes litigation 
abuse or a litigation explosion. 
7. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The 
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927-28 (1989); Maurice Rosenberg, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2198-
2202 (1989). 
8. See Order Amending the Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983); see also 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LA WYER RESPONSIBILITY 
(1984). Rules 7, 16, and 26 were similarly amended and were an integrated package. 
9. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11. 
10. The original Rule 11, adopted in 1938 and unchanged until 1983, required a showing 
of bad faith for sanctions to be imposed. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (1982). This, and general 
reluctance of judges and lawyers to accuse attorneys of such conduct, permitted the Rule to 
fall into disuse. See Risinger, supra note 3. I am indebted to Donna Stienstra, Beth Wiggins, 
and Thomas Willging for reviewing the material in the remainder of this section. Any errors 
that remain are mine. 
11. Carl Tobias, Reassessing Rule 11 and Civil Rights Cases, 33 How. L.J. 161, 163 
(1990); Tobias, supra note 6, at 490-507; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 
F.R.D. 189, 200 (1988). 
12. See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" 
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1327, 
1340 (1986); Vairo, supra note 11, at 200-01. 
13. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. 
dismissed, 485 U.S. 90 (1988); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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sizable sanctions. 14 
Many courts inconsistently interpreted the Rule's language or 
inconsistently enforced its provisions in similar factual contexts, and 
there was much satellite litigation involving Rule 11. 15 This activity 
had harmful implications for many parties, lawyers, and judges, but it 
particularly disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys, 
whose lack of resources can make them risk-averse. 16 These consider-
ations detrimentally affected and probably chilled the plaintiffs and 
lawyers. 17 
2. IMPROVEMENTS SINCE 1988 
In 1988, courts began to construe Rule 11 more favorably to 
most litigants and practitioners, especially civil rights plaintiffs and 
their counsel. 18 Every circuit court issued decisions that evinced 
solicitude for civil rights plaintiffs and attomeys. 19 Several appellate 
panels admonished trial judges for overzealous enforcement of Rule 
11 's prefiling inquiry requirements or for levying large sanctions that 
might discourage plaintiffs. 20 
Formal district court application also improved. For instance, 
many judges rejected Rule 11 motions filed against civil rights plain-
tiffs who were pursuing rather tenuous claims, or imposed minimal 
sanctions on parties found in violation.21 Indeed, since 1990, courts 
have issued few published opinions that lack solicitude for these plain-
tiffs. Although the number of circuit and trial court Rule 11 decisions 
in the federal reporter system steadily increased from 1984 to 1987, it 
levelled off in the district courts during 1987 and 1988, and the quan-
14. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd, 932 F.2d 1572 
(11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992) (imposing $1,000,000 sanction). 
15. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); see also Burbank, supra note 7, at 1930-31 (inconsistent 
application); Tobias, supra note 6, at 514 (satellite litigation). 
16. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 495-98. 
17. See id. at 503-06; Tobias, supra note 11, at 169-70. I recognize that these contentions 
are controversial. See Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Call For Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345, 347 (1990) [hereinafter Cal/for Comments]. 
18. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105, 
120-27 (1991); Tobias, supra note 11, at 162. 
19. The remainder of this paragraph addresses only formal judicial application with 
opinions that appear in the federal reporter system or on computer, rather than informal Rule 
11 activity. 
20. See Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990); accord Greenberg v. 
Hilton Int') Co., 870 F.2d 926, 935, reh'g granted, 875 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1989); Davis v. Crush, 
862 F.2d 84, 92 (6th Cir. 1988). 
21. See, e.g., Solberg v. Inline Corp., 740 F. Supp. 680, 686 (D. Minn. 1990); Summer v. 
Fuller, 718 F. Supp. 1523, 1525 (N.D. Ga. 1989). 
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tity of appellate and trial court opinions declined in 1989.22 
Although experience with Rule 11 has improved since 1988, sev-
eral concerns remain. Many observers have contended that some 
judges have not been solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs, as evidenced 
by several controversial cases. 23 Moreover, the improvements 
examined have been in formal Rule 11 activity. This is significant, 
because much Rule 11 activity that disadvantaged these plaintiffs 
most severely has been informal. 24 
C. Congressional Change in the Rule Revision Process 
Congress substantially modified the process for revising the Fed-
eral Rules in the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 
1988. 25 Congress hoped to improve the rule-amending procedures by 
subjecting them to greater public scrutiny. 26 The Act expressly pro-
vided that nearly all Advisory Committee deliberations be open to the 
public, and called for public input throughout the process of rules 
revision. 27 
D. Advisory Committee Reconsideration of Rule 11 
The Advisory Committee discussed Rule 11 for a half-day in its 
November 1989 meeting, one of the first sessions open to the public 
under the new procedures. Two individuals representing public inter-
est litigants presented evidence that the Rule was disadvantaging civil 
rights plaintiffs, and the Committee agreed to consider revision.28 
22. Thomas Willging, Deputy Research Director of the Federal Judicial Center, Statement 
at Advisory Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 23, 1991) (notes on file with author). 
See also ELIZABETH WIGGINS, THOMAS WILLGING, AND DONNA STIENSTRA, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CTR., RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, § ID, at 1 (1991) [hereinafter 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR.]. There also is a condensed version of the Final Report, see 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, FJC DIRECTIONS No. 2 (Nov. 1991) [hereinafter FJC 
DIRECTIONS]. 
23. See Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 540 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 516 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 1609 (1991); Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1989), ajf'd, 932 
F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992). 
24. Informal application is most detrimental because it is difficult to detect, document, and 
correct. See Tobias, supra note 18, at 117. 
25. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 
(1988). 
26. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284 
(1978) (reviewing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 
(1977)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c)(1)(2), (d) (1988). 
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (1988); see also Mullenix, supra note l, at 830-43. 
28. The individuals were Alan Morrison, Esq., of Public Citizen and Professor Laura 
Macklin of the Georgetown Law Center Institute for Public Representation. See generally 
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Representative Robert Kastenmeier, then the Chair of the House 
Committee on the Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administra-
tion of Justice, wrote Judge John Grady, then the Chair of the Advi-
sory Committee, requesting information on the Advisory Committee's 
examination of Rule 11.29 During February of 1990, Judge Grady 
indicated that the Rule warranted more study. 30 
These developments and the increasing criticism of Rule 11 
activity led the Advisory Committee to announce in August 1990 that 
it was reexamining Rule 11.31 The Committee issued a Call for Com-
ments, seeking written public input on the Rule's operation, that was 
due on November 1, 1990, and oral testimony to be submitted in Feb-
ruary 1991. 32 The Committee also commissioned an empirical evalu-
ation of Rule 11 by the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") and stated 
that the Committee would assess all of the material assembled in 
deciding whether to propose an additional amendment of the Rule at 
its semi-annual spring meeting. 33 The reconsideration of Rule 11 
accordingly became one of the initial attempts to employ the new rule 
revision process that Congress had mandated in 1988. 34 
E. Public Responses to Call for Comments 
More than 125 individuals and groups provided written com-
ments on the Rule, with the overwhelming majority criticizing Rule 
Mullenix, supra note 1, at 854 (describing 1989 Advisory Committee meeting). Judge Grady 
appointed a subcommittee comprised of Professor Paul Carrington of Duke University School 
of Law, the Committee Reporter, Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil of the Northern District of 
California, and Thomas E. Willging to identify important issues involving operation of Rule 11 
and to prepare a plan for empirical research. During December, Willging prepared a 
memorandum describing the state of empirical knowledge about Rule 11, focusing on issues 
that Carrington had identified as salient. After the FJC Research Division received comments 
from the subcommittee, Willging and others in the Division began planning and implementing 
an empirical study of Rule 11. 
29. Letter from Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, 
Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice to Judge John F. Grady, Civil Rules 
Chairman, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States (Jan. 9, 1990) (on file with author). 
30. Letter from Judge John F. Grady to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (Feb. 9, 1990) (on 
file with author). At that time, the FJC Research Division had formulated a basic research 
design and was elaborating its details. 
31. Call for Comments, supra note 17; see also Mullenix, supra note l, at 854. 
32. Call for Comments, supra note 17, at 345. Rule I l's controversial nature led the 
Committee to reverse the normal sequence of seeking public comment after it develops a 
proposal. 
33. Id.; see also Mullenix, supra note I, at 854. 
34. See Mullenix, supra note I, at 801 (providing comprehensive analysis of attempt to 
revise Rule 25.1 governing informal discovery). 
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11 and its application. 35 The principal objections were that the Rule 
was fostering excessive, costly satellite litigation, that judges were 
inconsistently implementing the provision, that Rule 11 activity was 
disadvantaging civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, and that the Rule 
was eroding civility among lawyers. 
The FJC completed the compilation and preliminary analysis of 
information on Rule 11 using computerized docket data from five dis-
tricts and responses from a survey of all federal trial judges. 36 The 
material gathered from the five districts indicates that civil rights 
plaintiffs, on the average, were no more likely to be sanctioned under 
Rule 11 than litigants who pursue other types of cases that experience 
a high rate of Rule 11 activity.37 Additionally, attorneys' fees remain 
the sanction of choice for courts, notwithstanding the availability of 
many non-monetary alternatives. 38 The material also revealed that 
eighty percent of district judges favor retaining Rule 11 in its 1983 
form, and a similar number believe that groundless lawsuits, the pri-
mary focus of that amendment, pose little difficulty.39 
Sixteen persons spoke at the February public hearing, many voic-
ing complaints similar to the written public comments.40 For exam-
ple, many witnesses criticized the satellite litigation that Rule 11 
foments, the Rule's unpredictability, inconsistent judicial enforce-
ment, and the chilling effect upon legitimate cases, especially civil 
rights actions.41 After the public hearing, the Advisory Committee 
agreed that some revision of Rule 11 was necessary and it requested 
the FJC to refine certain aspects of its preliminary analysis.42 The 
Committee Chair, Judge Sam Pointer of the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Alabama, and the Committee 
35. These comments are on file at the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in 
Washington, D.C. 
36. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CrR., supra note 22, §§ lA-lB. 
37. Id. IC, at 1-8. See also FJC Directions, supra note 22, at 21-27. 
38. Federal Judicial Ctr., supra note 22, § lB, at 9. The study revealed that fee awards to 
the opposing party constituted 70 to 93 percent of rulings that imposed sanctions in the five 
districts surveyed. The proposed Committee Note includes a thorough list of non-monetary 
alternatives. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Note (Proposed Official Draft 
1991); accord Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988). 
39. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CrR., supra note 22, § IA, at 1. 
40. Transcript of Public Hearing on Rule 11, New Orleans, La. (Feb. 21, 1991). 
41. Id.; Telephone interview with Thomas Willging and Elizabeth Wiggins, FJC Research 
Division (Feb. 26, 1991); Telephone interview with Professors Melissa Nelken, University of 
California, Hastings College of the Law, and Georgene Vairo, Fordham University School of 
Law (Feb. 26, 1991). See also supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text, and text following 
note 35. In fairness, the Committee invited more critics than proponents of Rule 11 to testify 
at the hearing. 
42. See sources cited supra notes 36-39. The Committee was particularly interested in 
having the FJC refine data relating to sanctioning in civil rights cases. 
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Reporter, Professor Paul Carrington of Duke University School of 
Law, assumed primary responsibility for drafting the proposed 
changes in Rule 1 l's terms and in the Advisory Committee Note 
which will be considered during the Committee's semi-annual meet-
ing in late May.43 
III. THE ADVISORY COMMI'ITEE'S PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE 
A. Preliminary Report on Rule 11 Studies 
Before the Advisory Committee discussed the suggestions for 
revising Rule 11, the individuals who compiled the FJC's preliminary 
analysis reported on continuing Rule 11 studies. 44 Elizabeth Wiggins, 
who refined some features of the preliminary assessment, stated that 
these efforts produced little new evidence. 45 Thomas Willging pro-
vided several pertinent observations about the Rule's impact on civil 
rights cases. Willging evaluated the case files for all civil rights suits 
in which judges imposed sanctions in five districts. His study showed 
that plaintiffs' Rule 11 violations consisted primarily of inadequate 
prefiling legal inquiries, occasionally of deficient factual investiga-
tions, and rarely of papers filed for improper purposes.46 Moreover, 
courts sanctioned few represented civil rights plaintiffs over the three-
year period examined. 47 Willging also believed that virtually none of 
the "cases presented good faith arguments for changes in the law and 
they were not the Brown v. Board of Education or Gideon v. Wain-
wright of the '90s. "48 This information and subsequent Committee 
discussion left the general impression that Rule 11 's implementation 
was not as problematic as many civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys 
43. The Committee Note accompanies the Rule and explains its language and the reasons 
why the Committee proposed changes. ' 
44. The emphasis that the Committee placed on public comment and the studies may have 
reflected sensitivity to the criticism that Rule 11 's 1983 revision was premised on minimal 
data. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
45. Elizabeth Wiggins, Research Division of the Federal Judicial Center, Statement at 
Advisory Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 23, 1991) (notes on file with author); 
see also supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
46. Willging, supra note 22; see also supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
47. Judges sanctioned the following number of represented civil rights plaintiffs in the 
following United States District Courts: District of Arizona, l; District of Columbia, 2; 
Northern District of Georgia, 7; Eastern District of Michigan, 6; Western District of Texas, 9. 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CrR., supra note 22, § lC, at 4-5. 
48. Willging, supra note 22. Willging added that in the "442 suit category" of civil rights 
cases, judges imposed no sanctions on plaintiffs pursuing voting rights or housing 
discrimination claims. Those employment discrimination cases in which judges imposed 
sanctions involved "private employment discrimination mostly and the sanctions imposed 
were relatively modest monetary amounts." Id. 
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had contended. 49 
Wiggins and Willging found 835 reported cases in which district 
courts applied Rule 11 to sanction motions and 346 reported appellate 
opinions between 1984 and 1989.50 They suggested that reported 
decisions are the "tip of the iceberg" of Rule 11 activity and made a 
very preliminary estimate that only one to ten percent of the judici-
ary's application of the Rule to sanction motions appears in reported 
determinations.51 Between 1984 and 1989, district courts in the 
Northern District of Illinois and the Southern District of New York 
issued thirty-eight percent of the reported opinions, with the Southern 
District of New York accounting for one-quarter of all the 
decisions. 52 
Willging also explained the preliminary results of the American 
Judicature Society ("AJS") study oflawyers in the Second, Fifth, and 
Ninth Circuits who had experience with Rule 11 during the preceding 
year.53 In July, the AJS issued a "Preliminary Report" that posited 
numerous tentative determinations similar to those of the FJC, 
although cautioning that more definitive conclusions must await 
refinement of the data collected. 54 Perhaps most relevant to this 
paper is the AJS' observation that Rule 11 apparently has been more 
problematic in "ordinary litigation," such as automobile accident 
cases, than in high profile or controversial suits, such as civil rights 
actions.55 
B. Descriptive Analysis of Specific Changes Proposed 
1. REPRESENTATIONS TO COURT 
The Advisory Committee proposed a new Rule ll(b),56 titled 
49. See Mullenix, supra note I, at 825; Tobias, supra note I8. 
50. Willging, supra note 22; see also FED. JUDICIAL CrR., supra note 22, § ID at 1. 
"Reported" opinions are those published in the federal reporter system. 
51. Wiggins, supra note 45; Willging, supra note 22; cf STEVEN B. BURBANK, AMERICAN 
JUDICATURE Soc'Y, RULE I I IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT Of THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK 
FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE Of CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 59, 98-99 (I989) (suggesting only 
10% of Rule 11 decisionmaking appears in federal reporter system and less than 40% on 
computerized services). 
52. Willging, supra note 22; accord FEDERAL JUDICIAL CrR., supra note 22, § ID at I-2; 
Vairo, supra note 11, at 200. 
53. See HERBERT KRITZER ET AL., AMERICAN JUDICATURE Soc'Y, RULE I I STUDY: 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (I99I). Willging stated that the AJS study collected the "most 
systematic data to date on attorneys' experiences with Rule 11 in their daily practices [and] 
promised to be an informative final report." Willging, supra note 22. 
54. KRITZER, supra note 53. 
55. Id. at 5-7; see also David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 3 I UCLA 
L. REV. 72 (I983). 
56. There also is a new Rule ll(a), titled "Signature." FED. R. C1v. P. ll(a) (Proposed 
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"Representations to Court," which provides: 
By presenting or maintaining a claim, defense, request, demand, 
objection, contention, or argument in a pleading, written motion, or 
other paper filed with or submitted to the court, an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying, until it is withdrawn, that to the 
best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after 
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances-
(!) it is not being presented or maintained for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation,· 
(2) it is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or 
the establishment of new law; and 
(3) any allegations or denials of facts have evidentiary support 
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or 
discovery. 57 
The subdivision preserves the requirement that lawyers and pro se 
litigants58 file papers only for proper purposes. It also retains, with 
certain modifications, the command that attorneys and unrepresented 
parties perform reasonable inquiries into the law and the facts before 
signing documents that they submit to courts. 59 Proposed Rule 11 (b ), 
however, includes several significant changes. 
a. Continuing Duty 
Most important is the Committee's decision to impose a "contin-
uing duty" on lawyers and pro se litigants to withdraw practically any 
part of a paper when it becomes untenable.6() The Note which would 
accompany the new Rule explains that a party's obligation to "stop 
Official Draft 1991). See infra notes 214-215 and accompanying text. The proposed Rule and 
its accompanying Advisory Committee Note are reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 74-82 (1991). 
57. FED. R. C1v. P. l l(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
58. Represented parties are not subject to the proposed Rule's requirements. This 
responds to Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 928-31 
(1991), which held that represented parties who sign papers are subject to existing Rule I l's 
requirements. Consequently, the technical nature of numerous requirements in the proposal 
will make them especially onerous for pro se litigants. 
59. The proposal essentially retains the idea that certification be to the best of the signer's 
knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry. FED. R. C1v. P. l l(b) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1991 ). 
60. Id. ("By presenting or maintaining a claim, defense, request, demand, objection, 
contention, or argument in a pleading, motion, or other paper filed with or submitted to the 
court, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying, until it is withdrawn .... "). The Rule 
covers the "continued maintenance in federal court of totally meritless claims or defenses" 
raised in state court before removal. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed 
Official Draft 1991 ). 
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and think" before filing legal or factual assertions includes the respon-
sibility to abandon positions that cease to have merit. 61 The Note 
states that the proposal partially expands litigants' duties to the court, 
while it places increased restraints on judges. The Note also affords 
judges more flexibility when treating infractions of Rule 11, so that 
the use of attorneys' fees as sanctions could be substantially reduced. 62 
This observation and others, such as those on "safe harbors," in 
the Note and Committee deliberations,63 illuminate the Committee's 
thinking. The imposition of a continuing duty appears to be only a 
minor extension of the prefiling duty to stop and think. Moreover, 
mechanisms, such as safe harbor provisions, would appear to offset 
the expanded responsibility created by a continuing duty.64 
Notwithstanding this impression, the continuing duty substan-
tially departs from Rule 11 and its attendant Advisory Committee 
note. The Rule's present language applies exclusively to the initial 
signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers.65 The Note expressly 
admonishes district court judges to test the signer's behavior by ask-
ing what was reasonable at the time of signing, and to avoid using the 
"wisdom of hindsight," because Rule 11 was not meant to restrict 
lawyers' creativity or enthusiasm in pursuing legal or factual theo-
ries. 66 Accordingly, a clear majority of the circuits have refused to 
recognize a continuing obligation. 67 
61. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 proposed advisory committee's note (Proposed Draft Aug., 1991). 
62. Id. 
63. "Safe harbors" are mechanisms that insulate litigants from sanctions, such as the 
ability to withdraw a deficient claim upon being notified of its inadequacy. See infra notes 114-
23 and accompanying text. 
64. During the meeting, the Committee discussed the continuing duty idea only 
minimally, and most Committee members seemed to assume that its imposition was 
appropriate. This was one of numerous explicit and implicit compromises that the Committee 
struck. See infra notes 117-18, 220-21, 256-57 and accompanying text. 
65. FED. R. C1v. P. 11; see also Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1200-01 
(7th Cir. 1990); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 
U.S. 918 (1987). 
66. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note. 
67. Compare Dahnke, 906 F.2d at 1201 (no continuing duty); Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Associated Contractors, 877 F.2d 
938, 943 (I Ith Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1133 (1990); Thomas v. Capital Sec. 
Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 874-75 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (same); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 
F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987) (same); Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273-74 with Anderson v. Beatrice 
Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 393 (1st Cir. 1990) (continuing duty). One Sixth Circuit panel, in 
Jackson v. Law Firm of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne & Taylor, 875 F.2d 1224, 1229 (6th Cir. 
1989), cast doubt on the idea of a continuing duty that another panel of the court apparently 
articulated in Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 1988) (continuing 
duty). A similar situation obtains in the Fourth Circuit. One panel o.f the court, in Brubaker 
v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1382 (4th Cir. 1991), cast doubt on the idea of a 
continuing duty that another panel of the court apparently articulated in Blue v. United States 
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The proposed duty is inadvisable for several important policy 
and practical reasons. It will place burdensome responsibilities on 
attorneys and parties, especially those with limited resources, those 
pursuing nontraditional lawsuits, or those whose cases are "close" 
legally or factually. Demanding that lawyers and pro se litigants 
withdraw any "claim, defense, request, demand, objection, conten-
tion, or argument in a pleading, written motion, or other paper" once 
it seems invalid is onerous. 68 One major complication is that the obli-
gation parses too finely the concept of a "paper" and could encourage 
the scrutiny of minutiae, a practice that numerous courts have 
rejected since 1983. These courts consider the significance of a spe-
cific claim to the entire paper or evaluate the paper as a whole in 
ascertaining whether signers violated Rule 11. 69 In many situations, 
the duty will impose responsibilities that are difficult to satisfy. For 
instance, lawyers and unrepresented parties would have to identify 
and track every assertion from the date of filing until the litigation's 
conclusion to pinpoint if, and when, any one loses merit so that it may 
be immediately withdrawn. Opposing attorneys could invoke Rule 11 
throughout a lawsuit, especially as to factual assertions, and disrupt 
its vigorous pursuit, securing strategic benefits that some practitioners 
will be unable to resist. 70 
Even in cases that involve less arduous burdens, where deficient 
assertions can be identified comparatively easily, the continuing obli-
gation will require lawyers and pro se litigants to perform tasks unre-
lated to their lawsuits' merits. 71 For example, if a plaintiff learns in 
the middle of discovery that an automobile accident happened at a 
different intersection than the one originally pied, the party must 
promptly notify the court and opposing litigants to correct the offend-
Department of the Anny, 914 F.2d 525, 544-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 C. Ct. 1580 
(1991). See also Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 943 
n.5 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (refusing to recognize continuing duty when issue not 
briefed). 
68. FED. R. C1v. P. ll(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
69. See, e.g., Burull v. First Nat'! Bank, 831 F.2d 788, 789-90 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
485 U.S. 961 (1988); Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1434 n.2 (7th 
Cir. 1987); Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1280; Premium Financing v. Greater N.Y. Mutual Ins., 136 
F.R.D. 175, 178 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Vista Mfg. v. TRAC-4, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 134, 140 (N.D. 
Ind. 1990). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, recently overruled 
several panels that had relied on the "paper as a whole" theory. Townsend v. Holman 
Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362-65 (9th Cir. 1990); see also In re Grantham Bros., 922 
F.2d 1.438, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991); Dodd Ins. Servs. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d 1152, 
1158 (10th Cir. 1991). 
70. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text; see also Marcus, supra note 5, at 494. 
71. I am indebted to John Frank, Esq. of Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, Az., for numerous ideas 
in this paragraph. 
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ing paper, essentially polishing pleadings that had ceased to have any 
value. This activity will distract parties, attorneys, and judges from 
the substance of disputes and impose unwarranted expenses while 
fruitlessly complicating lawsuits. 
Insofar as the continuing duty represents an attempt to end 
innocuous conduct that is less reprehensible than abuse, the goal 
appears unattainable and the effort inadvisable. For instance, some 
negligent or inadvertent activity simply may be intrinsic to, or a fixed 
cost of, the complexities of federal court practice or human endeavor. 
Thus, efforts to end such activity are unrealistic and unfair. When 
conduct is attributable to the substantial resource discrepancies that 
exist among numerous federal court litigants, sanctioning and essen-
tially punishing the behavior seem inequitable.72 It is similarly unfair 
and impracticable to expect every attorney to practice at a level of 
precision only the wealthiest clients can afford or the most exper-
ienced lawyers can attain. In any event, courts already possess other 
mechanisms, such as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16, 26, and 37, 
to treat much conduct that is less harmful than abuse. 73 
These and additional reasons make the obligation peculiarly 
inappropriate in litigation, such as discrimination cases, that seeks to 
vindicate fundamental constitutional rights or prescribed legislative 
interests. Imposing this duty on plaintiffs is particularly troublesome 
because it frustrates clear congressional intent that the judiciary facili-
tate the vindication of such rights and interests-activity which can 
contribute to positive growth in the law.74 
The considerations are acute in many civil rights cases, particu-
larly those that allege discrimination, tum on defendant's mindset, are 
highly fact-dependent, or involve credibility. For example, in Blue v. 
United States Department of the Army,15 a controversial employment 
discrimination class action, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial 
judge's finding that plaintiffs and their counsel had contravened Rule 
11. 76 By sustaining the district court's decision that some of plaintiffs' 
allegations were frivolous after it had resolved many questions of 
credibility against the parties, the Fourth Circuit effectively punished 
their lawyers for pursuing the very credibility judgments that the 
adversary system is meant to provide. Many courts, however, have 
72. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 495-98; see also infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
73. See infra notes 273-77 and accompanying text. 
74. This intent is recognized by substantive, procedural, and fee-shifting legislation. See, 
e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1988); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards 
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988); see also Tobias, supra note 3, at 284-85. 
75. 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). 
76. Blue was the largest such class action ever brought against the Army. Id. at 531. 
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not allowed adverse credibility findings at trial to support the shifting 
of litigation expenses. 77 
In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 78 the Supreme Court 
explicitly instructed appellate and district judges not to base sanctions 
on hindsight determinations.79 Sanctioning attorneys who fail to pre-
dict credibility accurately contravenes this hindsight instruction and 
misconceives the role of lawyers. It not only blurs the distinction 
between attorneys and finders of fact, but also erodes clients' entitle-
ment to zealous and loyal advocacy. 80 
The crucial consequence of imposing this continuing duty is that 
it will discourage, and perhaps chill, civil rights plaintiffs and law-
yers-the very individuals whom Rule 11 may have disadvantaged 
the most since 1983.81 Because many of these individuals possess lim-
ited resources, the duty's burdensome nature and the risk of sanctions 
or having to participate in expensive satellite litigation could dissuade 
them from vigorously pursuing valid cases. 82 Consequently, these 
plaintiffs and lawyers may be discouraged, even though the Commit-
tee specifically attempted to minimize potential chilling. 83 
Inclusion of the continuing obligation, by increasing the respon-
sibilities of parties and lawyers to the court, affords some advantages, 
77. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 183·84 (1976); District No. 8, Int'l Ass'n 
of Machinists v. Clearing, 807 F.2d 618, 622 (7th Cir. 1986); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 
1265, 1277-78 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). In Blue, the trial judge's 
conclusions respecting frivolousness were premised on the credibility of witnesses. The Fourth 
Circuit relied substantially on the lower court's credibility determinations and the panel's own 
de novo observations as to whether plaintiffs proffered credible evidence. Yet, some of the 
district judge's conclusions lacked uniformity or were internally inconsistent. Further, neither 
the Fourth Circuit nor the district judge explained how plaintiffs' lawyers could have predicted 
what testimony the trial court would ultimately believe or why the attorneys were required to 
challenge clients who were pursuing claims with documentary substantiation. 914 F.2d at 540. 
78. 434 U.S. 412 (1978). 
79. Id. at 421-22; see also supra notes 65-67, 75-77 and accompanying text. 
80. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 189 (1986) (Blackmun, J. concurring) (arguing 
that the Court's holding erodes client's right to zealous, loyal advocacy); Greenberg v. Sala, 
822 F.2d 882, 886-87 (9th Cir. 1987) (blurring roles of lawyers and fact finders); cf. Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (prohibiting judges from making credibility 
determinations on summary judgment). 
81. Although the question whether Rule 11 has chilled civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys 
is controversial, considerable evidence suggests that the enthusiasm of many of the parties and 
attorneys has been dampened, if not chilled. See, e.g .. Tobias, supra note II, at 169-70; Vairo, 
supra note II, at 200-01, 232-33; see also Mullenix, supra note l, at 825 n.151; Call for 
Comments, supra note 17, at 347-48; infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
82. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 495-98. These practical considerations are peculiarly 
applicable to much employment discrimination litigation which involves credibility 
determinations and questions of motive and intent. 
83. At the Advisory Committee meeting, aimost every Committee member voiced concern 
about chilling, which resulted in attempts to reduce potential chilling, such as the explicit 
provision for safe harbors and nonmonetary sanctions. 
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such as reducing litigation abuse and expediting dispute resolution, 
thus effectuating the purposes of the 1983 amendments. 84 However, 
realization of these advantages seems speculative, because it would be 
contingent on the duty's ideal operation. 85 
b. Certification Respecting Law 
The present Rule requires that signers undertake reasonable 
prefiling inquiries to certify that their papers are "warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law."86 The proposed Rule commands signers 
to certify that certain components of a paper are "warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modifi-
cation, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. " 87 
The most significant proposed change is substitution of the term 
"nonfrivolous" for "good faith" as a modifier of legal argument. 88 
The Committee discussed these two possibilities and the word "rea-
sonable," but selected "nonfrivolous," maintaining that several cir-
cuits have employed the term and that courts understand it. 89 Some 
members favored retaining "good faith," however, because the phrase 
would not alter existing terminology that has acquired certain mean-
ing to which judges, lawyers, and litigants are accustomed.90 
Several criticisms, in addition to that of losing familiar language, 
can be levelled at the Committee's approach. Many courts have 
experienced problems applying "frivolousness" to Rule 11.91 For 
example, judges who rely on it often unduly emphasize the papers' 
quality or the claims' merits (product), rather than the reasonableness 
of prefiling inquiries (conduct).92 Courts that stress product have 
84. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note. 
85. For instance, judges, parties, and attorneys would have to apply the duty properly. 
This does not imply that litigants and lawyers should have limited obligations to the court or 
that imposing continuing duties will be an inefficacious means for achieving certain advantages 
in the litigation process. But, as a practical matter, the imposition of a continuing duty may be 
too onerous for plaintiffs and defendants. 
86. FED. R. C1v. P. 11. 
87. See FED. R. C1v. P. l l(b)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
88. Compare id. ("nonfrivolous") with FED. R. C1v. P. 11 ("good faith"). 
89. Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer, C.D. Cal., Judge Sam N. Pointer, Jr., N.D. Ala., Professor 
Arthur R. Miller, Harvard Law School, and Larrine S. Holbrooke, Esq., Statements at 
Advisory Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 23, 1991) (notes on file with author). 
90. Miller, supra note 89; Holbrooke, supra note 89. Similar sentiments were expressed 
numerous times during the Committee's deliberations, especially when it was drafting specific 
language. 
91. See, e.g., ViON Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Romero 
v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Burbank, supra note 7, at 
1933-34, 1941-42. 
92. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1494, 1500-01 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
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encountered difficulties articulating uniform standards for discerning 
frivolousness-a notion inherently resistant to consistent definition-
and providing sufficient guidance and deterrence to attorneys and par-
ties. 93 Even if frivolousness were more appropriate, substituting it for 
good faith imposes onerous requirements on lawyers and litigants 
who have limited resources or pursue nontraditional or unpopular 
legal theories, such as public interest and civil rights litigants. 94 
The proposed change may offer a few benefits. For example, the 
Committee candidly admitted that the current Rule "occasionally has 
created problems for a party which seeks to assert novel legal conten-
tions"9s and responded by permitting arguments for the "establish-
ment of new law."96 
c. Certification Respecting Factual Assertions 
The existing Rule mandates that signers conduct reasonable 
prefiling inquiries to certify that their papers are "well grounded in 
fact. "97 The recommended text requires signers to certify that "any 
allegations or denials of facts have evidentiary support or, if specifi-
cally so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a rea-
sonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."98 
A number of courts have stated that the present Rule proscribes 
filing suit and using discovery "as the sole means of finding out 
whether you have a case."99 The Note to the proposed Rule explains 
that parties sometimes have sound reasons to think that facts are false 
Even authors of clear Rule 11 decisions emphasize the quality of the papers or the merits of the 
litigation. See, e.g., Alia v. Michigan Supreme Court, 906 F.2d llOO, 1103 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(Wellford, J., dissenting); Davis v. earl, 906 F.2d 533 (1 lth Cir. 1990). Neither the papers nor 
the merits are irrelevant. The court, however, should initially attempt to determine whether 
there was a reasonable prefiling inquiry. Only after that effort proves inconclusive should the 
court consider the papers or the merits to determine reasonableness. Tobias, supra note 18, at 
108 n.11. 
93. See BURBANK, supra note 51, at 20-21; Carl Tobias, Certification and Civil Rights, 136 
F.R.D. 223, 226 (1991). 
94. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv. v. canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1086 (7th Cir. 1987), 
(Cudahy, J., dissenting) cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 
1265, 1280-81 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987); see also Tobias, supra note 6, at 
495-98. 
95. Attachment to Letter from Judge Pointer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
to Judge Robert Keeton, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 
(June 13, 1991) [hereinafter Attachment to Letter] (on file with author). 
96. FED. R. C1v. P. 1 l(b)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
97. FED. R. C1v. P. 11. 
98. See FED. R. C1v. P. 1 l(b)(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
99. Szabo Food Serv. v. canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. 
dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); accord Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 692 (5th Cir. 1986); 
Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1388 n.276 (E.D.N.C. 1987). Numerous courts have 
stated that Rule 11 does not modify the flexible notice pleading system of the Federal Rules. 
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or true but need discovery to collect evidentiary substantiation for 
their beliefs. 100 The Committee acknowledged that the Rule had 
posed difficulties for these litigants, recognized the propriety of per-
mitting the parties to plead facts that lack evidentiary support and of 
affording them discovery, and partially clarified the relationships 
among discovery, Rule 11, and Rule 8, which governs pleading. 101 
The proposal requires, however, that litigants withdraw allega-
tions for which they cannot secure evidentiary substantiation after 
having reasonable opportunity for additional investigation or discov-
ery. 102 The command expressly applies to denials under Rule 8 based 
on lack of information and was part of the Committee's avowed effort 
to equalize the burdens that Rule 11 imposes on plaintiffs and 
defendants. 103 
The proposal's effect on the existing imbalance is unclear. For 
example, the Committee did not address the current disequilibrium 
created by the nationwide requirement that civil rights plaintiffs plead 
with specificity under Rule 8. 104 Such elevated pleading will compli-
cate compliance with the proposal's strictures as to facts by, for 
instance, demanding that the parties place more factual allegations 
in their papers. Even if the burdens were equalized, both plaintiffs 
and defendants should have reduced, not similarly onerous, 
responsibilities. 
The proposal's imposition of a "duty of candor" on attorneys 
and pro se litigants to inform the court and other parties when they 
include factual assertions that "are likely to have evidentiary support 
See, e.g., Beeman v. Fiester, 852 F.2d 206, 210-11 (7th Cir. 1988); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 
F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987). 
100. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
Judge Pointer offered a cogent example during the meeting. He stated that the proposal would 
permit an employment discrimination plaintiff confronting a 90-day statute of limitations to 
plead what could not be proved at the time and to withdraw the allegations if discovery 
showed that they were untenable. Pointer, supra note 89. 
101. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991); 
accord Attachment to Letter, supra note 95, at 2. 
102. See FED. R. C1v. P. l l(b)(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1991) (emphasis added); see also 
FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
103. See FED. R. C1v. P. 8(b); FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (Proposed Official Draft 1991). One 
important reason why fewer sanction motions have been filed against defendants is that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure afford defendants only a short time to answer complaints, 
thus making answers and defendants less vulnerable to sanctions. Insofar as the proposed 
change represents an attempt to seek a proper balance in Rule 11, it seems advisable. 
104. All circuits now require that plaintiffs plead with particularity. See Hobson v. Wilson, 
737 F.2d l, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984); accord Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 (5th Cir. 1985). 
For a recent example, see Arnold v. Board of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 309 n.2 (11th Cir. 1989). 
But cf. Tobias, supra note 3, at 296-301 (noting that Rule S's language, courts' authority, and 
other data do not support elevated pleading requirements). 
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after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discov-
ery" 105 is unnecessarily burdensome. The obligation will particularly 
disadvantage litigants who lack access to information relevant to their 
papers or have few resources for gathering, assessing, and synthesiz-
ing material that is more accessible. 
Compliance would be impossible in numerous situations. For 
example, when facts pertinent to plaintiffs' cases are in defendants' 
minds or when parties possess little time or money to assemble and 
evaluate relatively accessible information, they will be unable to iden-
tify specifically "any allegations or denials of facts [that] are likely to 
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery." 106 Even if these litigants do not have to 
speculate, they may experience difficulty determining precisely which 
factual contentions are likely to have evidentiary substantiation and 
exactly what would be a reasonable opportunity for additional investi-
gation and discovery, much less ascertaining how a fact-finder ulti-
mately will view the predictions. 107 Indeed, these are the very type of 
fact-specific inquiries that have engendered inconsistency, satellite liti-
gation, and chilling since 1983. 108 
Even in circumstances where parties with scarce resources or 
limited access to relevant data could discharge the duty of candor 
more readily, they still may be disadvantaged. For instance, if the 
litigants can easily identify "allegations or denials [that] are likely to 
have evidentiary support,"109 compliance may compromise their cases 
by requiring that parties' pleadings reveal possible factual weaknesses. 
This duty also could encumber pleading because it effectively 
demands that plaintiffs plead on information and belief and, thus, 
additionally erodes Rule S's integral purpose of simplifying 
pleading. 110 
105. FED. R. C1v. P. l l(b)(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). Judge Schwarzer initially 
articulated this duty of candor; however, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit refused to impose that 
obligation. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 127 (N.D. 
Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531, 1539 (9th Cir. 1986). 
The Committee first proposed to impose this duty as to legal assertions, and then as to 
both factual and legal assertions, before it settled on factual assertions alone. See FED. R. C1v. 
P. l l(b)(2)-(3) (Proposed Draft May 24, 1991) (copy on file with author); FED. R. C1v. P. 
l l(b)(2)-(3) (Proposed Draft June 13, 1991) (copy on file with author). 
106. FED. R. C1v. P. l l(b)(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
107. These difficulties hark back to those involving credibility determinations and judicial 
hindsight discussed supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
108. FED. R. C1v. P. l l(b)(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1991); see also infra notes 244-47, 
252-55 and accompanying text. 
109. FED. R. C1v. P. l l(b)(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
110. FED. R. C1v. P. 8(a) ("A pleading ... shall contain (l) a short and plain statement of 
the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends [and] (2) a short and plain statement 
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Many of these problems complicate compliance with the contin-
uing duty. For example, it would be difficult to track all factual alle-
gations or denials to detect exactly when they no longer have or are 
likely to have evidentiary support, as reasonable opportunity for 
investigation or discovery has expired so that the assertions may be 
promptly abandoned. 
The provisions governing allegations and denials of facts may 
afford certain benefits. For instance, the duty of candor may alert 
judges early in litigation to potentially questionable factual conten-
tions. These advantages, however, are less compelling than the disad-
vantages posed. 
2. SANCTIONS 
The Committee suggested a new Rule 11 ( c ), titled "Sanctions." 
This subdivision retains the requirement that courts impose an appro-
priate sanction, including monetary awards and attorneys' fees, when 
they determine that attorneys or parties contravened Rule 11. The 
Rule also incorporates several important modifications. 111 
a. Procedures for Sanctioning 
Rule 1 l(c) enumerates broad procedures that cover sanction-
ing. 112 The Committee provided them because such provisions are 
virtually absent from existing Rule 11, and many judges had afforded 
minimal or inconsistent procedures, especially for purposes of due 
process. 113 
1. Safe Harbors 
Movants would only be able to seek sanctions twenty-one days 
(or such other time as the court may prescribe) after service of 
motions which describe the specific offending behavior, and offering 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."); see also supra notes 103-05 and 
accompanying text. 
111. See FED. R. C1v. P. 1 l(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
112. Most of the procedures proposed in Rule 1 l(c)(l)(A) and Rule 1 l(c)(3) and are treated 
here. Those procedures for sanctioning on the court's initiative are analyzed separately infra 
Part 111.B.2.a.ii. 
113. Current Rule 11 is practically devoid of procedures. See FED R. C1v. P. 11; 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, INTERIM REPORT ON RULE 11, at 12 (Apr. 9, 
1991) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]; cf FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note 
(quoting two paragraphs to procedural prescriptions). For examples of inconsistent 
procedures, compare Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1558-59 (11th Cir. 1987) with Tom 
Growney Equip. v. Shelly Irrigation Dev., 834 F.2d 833, 836 (9th Cir. 1987) and Thomas v. 
Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 871-75 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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them an opportunity to withdraw or correct the suspect allegation. 114 
This procedure is dubbed the "safe harbor." Although several Com-
mittee members contended that violators of the improper purpose 
prong do not deserve such protection, 115 the Committee failed to 
adopt that position, and neither the proposal's text nor the Note men-
tions it. 
A true safe harbor, if workable, affords needed protection for 
parties with scant resources or those who pursue nontraditional, 
close, unpopular, or political cases. 116 The measure's inclusion was an 
important means of responding to criticism of Rule 11, especially its 
tendency to chill. 117 The safe harbor, thus, embodies the Committee's 
efforts to strike an appropriate balance among the competing, often 
conflicting interests which the proposal would affect. 118 Moreover, 
the informal operation of the mechanism could resolve some disputes 
over particular allegations and therefore reduce litigation expenses of 
attorneys, parties, and judges.119 
However, the safe harbor suggested will entail certain disadvan-
tages. It may not limit the costs or have the effects described above. 
The procedure also would provide the opponents of its intended bene-
ficiaries numerous opportunities for tactical use and abuse. 12° For 
example, litigants that contemplate filing sanctions motions must 
notify other parties of every purported violation throughout the law-
suit. Each time a litigant receives notice, the safe harbor will require 
that the target undertake much activity in a three-week period. The 
114. FED. R. C1v. P. l l(c)(l)(A) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
115. Judge Winter was this idea's foremost proponent, although a few other members 
concurred. Judge Ralph K. Winter, 2d Cir., Statement at Advisory Committee Meeting, 
Washington, D.C. (May 23-24, 1991) (notes on file with author). 
116. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 495-98. 
117. See supra notes 17, 24, 28, 64 and accompanying text; infra notes 256-57 and 
accompanying text. Some members apparently found the perception that Rule 11 chills 
legitimate litigation sufficient to warrant an amendment. That idea at least seems to have 
motivated the Committee's request that the FJC refine its data on civil rights cases. See supra 
note 42 and accompanying text. 
118. These competing interests include: the need to minimize the Rule's chilling effects; the 
need to achieve its principal purpose, deterrence of litigation abuse, with fewer 
disadvantageous side effects; and the need to increase lawyers' and litigants' responsibilities to 
the court represented by the continuing duty. 
119. When the opponent withdraws the challenged allegation, attorneys and parties would 
save costs because the equivalent of a letter would suffice to provide notice and obviate the 
need for spending resources on elaborate motions. Consequently, courts would expend no 
resources resolving motions. 
120. This harks back to the continuing duty problem. The proposed Committee Note, 
however, does warn against using sanction motions for "improper purposes," such as 
emphasizing the merits of a litigant's position, and that these motions are sanctionable. FED. 
R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
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party will have twenty-one days to analyze the procedural and sub-
stantive validity of the notice; reassess its own allegations; conduct 
additional research, if indicated; withdraw or correct questionable 
assertions, even potentially legitimate ones; formulate responses that 
persuasively defend those contentions which are not withdrawn or 
corrected; and perhaps reconsider the advisability of continuing the 
litigation. Many attorneys will dispute the notice's timing and clarity, 
especially in terms of breadth and particularity, as it must only 
"describe the specific conduct" alleged to violate the Rule. 121 Courts 
will have to resolve those and other technical controversies when 
targets refuse to withdraw or correct the challenged assertions and 
movants request sanctions. 122 
These factors suggest that the proposed safe harbor may merely 
place an official imprimatur on much problematic informal practice 
under current Rule 11. 123 Indeed, the procedure could accentuate one 
of that Rule's worst features: its "threat and retreat" aspect, which 
deflects the focus of cases from the litigants' claims to the lawyers' 
abilities, undermining even more civility in the profession and inun-
dating all involved with additional paper. In short, the safe harbor, 
although well-intentioned, would afford few meaningful benefits and 
will have detrimental ramifications for courts, parties, and attor-
neys-especially by increasing litigation expenses. 
ii. Independent Sanctions Motions 
The subdivision requires that motions be independently served, 
not attached as separate prayers for relief in other papers as is preva-
lent under the existing Rule. 124 The Committee intended to make 
sanctions' pursuit more onerous, thereby reducing Rule 11 activity. 125 
iii. Notice and Opportunity to Respond and Order 
The proposal includes two significant additional procedures. 
First, its prefatory phrase requires that judges afford targets "notice 
and a reasonable opportunity to respond." 126 The Note explains that 
the specific circumstances present will suggest appropriate proce-
121. FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c)(l)(A) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
122. Of course, the underlying question of whether a Rule 11 violation occurred lurks 
behind these technical problems and awaits judicial resolution. 
123. I am indebted to John Frank for numerous ideas in this paragraph. 
124. FED. R. C1v. P. l l(c)(l)(A) (Proposed Official Draft 1991) ("A motion ... shall be 
served separately from other motions or requests . . . . "). 
125. Advisory Comm. Meeting, supra note 22. The Committee seemed to believe that this 
requirement ultimately would save judges, lawyers, and litigants time. 
126. FED. R. C1v. P. l l(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
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<lures, such as written submissions, oral argument, or an evidentiary 
hearing. 127 Second, courts must explain the violative behavior and the 
basis of the sanction levied, if requested by the non-moving party. 128 
The Note states that judges should give their reasons when granting 
Rule 11 motions but normally need not explain denials. 129 
These procedures off er some benefits, especially by clarifying 
existing Rule 11. For instance, allowing infrequent explanations for 
the denial of sanctions requests promotes judicial economy. The pre-
scriptions also accord litigants more process than numerous courts 
had under the current Rule. Nevertheless, the Committee would 
leave for case-by-case determination the precise nature of notice, 
opportunity to respond, and sanctions' justification. 130 These deci-
sions may necessarily be case-specific but the lack of particularized 
guidance providing, for example, that procedures be tailored to viola-
tions' perceived severity could foster inconsistency and deficient 
process. 
iv. Timing of Sanctions Motions 
The Rule leaves open for case-by-case resolution the question 
when to file sanctions motions. 131 The Note explains that motions 
should ordinarily be served immediately after the alleged offense 
occurs and could be considered untimely if delayed. 132 In some situa-
tions, parties should only make motions once other litigants have had 
a "reasonable opportunity for discovery," but the safe harbor mecha-
nism precludes movants from awaiting the litigation's conclusion or 
the particular allegation's disposition. 133 
This treatment appears responsive to concerns about timing. 
Tardy motions have prejudiced numerous lawyers and parties for 
many reasons, as when relevant evidence had become stale or delay 
led to unfair surprise or to an increase in the sanctions ultimately 
requested. 134 Sanctions that were prematurely sought simply to 
127. FED. R. Ctv. P. 11 advisory committe note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
128. FED. R. Ctv. P. l l(c)(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
129. FED. R. Ctv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
130. Id. ("Whether the matter should be decided solely on the basis of written submissions 
or should be scheduled for oral argument (or, indeed, for evidentiary presentation) will depend 
on the circumstances."). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. Some courts have so held. See, e.g., Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 133-35 (2d 
Cir. 1985); Roe v. Operation Rescue, No. 88-5157 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1989); Feldman v. 
Village of Lombard, No. 86 C 3295 (N.D. Ill. March 26, 1987). 
133. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991); see 
also Chambers v. Nasco, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2138-39 (1991). 
134. Perhaps the most compelling recent example is In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 
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dramatize the motion's seriousness or as an intimidation technique 
have harmed others, such as by interrupting their cases' pursuit. 135 
The Note states that attorneys should not invoke Rule 11 for these 
purposes and suggests that judges defer potentially disruptive motions 
until the suit's termination. 136 The principal remaining difficulty is 
that the proposal leaves much to case-specific judicial resolution, 
although this may be endemic to many timing questions. 137 
v. Judicial Discretion/ Appellate Review 
The Note states that decisions on Rule violations and appropri-
ate sanctions are entrusted to trial judges' discretion and that appel-
late courts will review these determinations for abuses of discretion, 138 
thus retaining the Supreme Court standard articulated in Cooter & 
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 139 This approach lacks sufficient rigor, partic-
ularly for review of decisions by district judges who vigorously 
enforce Rule 11. For example, two Fourth Circuit panels deferen-
tially reviewed trial judges' findings that civil rights attorneys had 
contravened Rule 11. 140 Such appellate review of the district courts' 
overzealous application allowed substantial sanctions to be imposed 
on two preeminent civil rights lawyers in close, controversial cases. 141 
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991). Plaintiffs believed that the case concluded when 
they withdrew their claim pursuant to FED. R. C1v. P. 4l(a)(2) in April, 1989. The defendants 
reserved no rights but filed Rule 11 motions nearly two months later. In late September, 1989, 
the trial judge imposed substantial sanctions on plaintiffs. In re Kunstler, at 510. A year later, 
the Fourth Circuit upheld the lower court's finding of a Rule 11 violation but vacated the 
sanction imposed, id., and in April 1991, the Supreme Court denied counsel's petition for a 
writ of certiorari. Delay can reduce civility among judges, litigants, and lawyers, and 
complicate credibility determinations. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 113, at 12. 
135. Motions which seek substantial sanctions during pursuit of a case can chill the 
enthusiasm of litigants who are risk averse because they lack resources or power and can lead 
them to abandon litigation. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 495-98. 
136. Attorneys should not tender motions as a discovery mechanism, to stress the substance 
of a litigant's position, to extract an unfair settlement, to create conflicts of interest between 
clients and lawyers, or to seek disclosure of material otherwise protected as work product or by 
the attorney-client privilege. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official 
Draft 1991). The Committee Note evinces concern about disruption that is created when a 
disclosure of communications between lawyer and client is needed to ascertain whether the 
Rule was violated. Id. 
137. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 113, at 12 ("All of the suggestions tendered to the 
Committee about how the rule could be amended to deal with the question of timing have their 
own problems."). 
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
139. 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990). 
140. See Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990); cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 
1607 (1991). 
141. In reviewing whether Rule 11 had been violated, the Kunst/er panel did not scrutinize 
closely the district judge's factual or legal determinations, a number of which were erroneous. 
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The Eleventh Circuit similarly reviewed and let stand a one million-
dollar award levied by a trial judge against a public interest litigant, 
although that sanction could bankrupt the organization. 142 
b. Appropriate Sanction 
1. Introductory Consideration of Committee's Objectives 
The Committee, in providing judges guidance for selecting an 
appropriate sanction, apparently had four primary objectives. 143 It 
wanted to stress the availability of nonmonetary sanctions and that 
Rule 11 's principal purpose is deterring litigation abuse. The Com-
mittee also sought to reduce judicial reliance on financial sanctions, 
namely attorney-fee shifting, and on the Rule's compensatory goal. 144 
Indicia of these objectives are in the proposal's text, the Note, and 
Committee deliberations. One description of the proposal in the Note 
epitomizes Committee thinking: it "expands litigants' and lawyers' 
responsibilities to the court, while calling for greater judicial restraint 
in considering imposition of sanctions to deter [violative] conduct."145 
914 F.2d at 513-21. The panel, however, did vacate the sanctions imposed as inappropriate 
and afforded guidance that was solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs. Id. at 522-25. 
The Blue panel analyzed more closely the trial court's factual findings but deferred too 
greatly to its legal determinations. Certain of both types of rulings, however, were erroneous. 
Blue, 914 F.2d at 536-45. Nevertheless, the panel reversed certain sanctions because they were 
improperly levied. Id. at 544-50. 
The lawyer in Kunst/er was William Kunstler, the civil rights attorney who represented 
the "Chicago Seven." The lawyer in Blue was Julius Chambers, Director-Counsel of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund. One reason that such treatment could have chilling effects is 
that many civil rights lawyers become more cautious when the most respected among them are 
sanctioned. 
142. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992). 
These disadvantages outweigh deferential review's benefits, which include placing 
responsibility in the decisionmaker who typically is most familiar with the facts and the 
behavior of sanction targets and restricting the number of appeals by limiting their prospects 
for success. 
143. The court "shall impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or 
parties determined ... to be responsible for a violation." FED. R. C1v. P. 1 l(c) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1991 ). This subsection is organized differently because the appropriate sanction 
idea was central to the Committee's work and vital to its objectives. 
144. One helpful example is the Committee's recognition that a "monetary award may be 
the most effective deterrent in some circumstances." FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's 
note (Proposed Official Draft 1991 ). 
145. Id. The second iteration states that the "revision in part expands the responsibilities of 
litigants to the court, while providing greater constraints and flexibility in dealing with 
infractions of the rule." Id. A similar example is the quotation, supra note 144, and there 
were numerous analogous examples during Committee deliberations. See also supra note 64 
and accompanying text. 
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ii. The Proposal's Text 
The Committee achieved its objectives by defining "appropriate 
sanction," which is essentially undefined in existing Rule 11. 146 The 
proposal's text provides that it "shall be limited to what is sufficient to 
deter comparable conduct by persons similarly situated." 147 
The Committee rejected the suggestion that an appropriate sanc-
tion be one which is the "least severe adequate to deter." Judge Wil-
liam Schwarzer, who now directs the FJC, developed that idea in 
1984, 148 and several circuit courts subsequently adopted the notion. 149 
Most members thought that judges would view the phrase as requir-
ing the "absolute lowest sanctions"150 and thereby create an improper 
judicial mindset or send the signal that the Committee was relaxing 
concern about litigation abuse. 151 
The Committee elaborated upon the idea of an "appropriate 
sanction" by stating: 
The sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmone-
tary nature, an order to pay a monetary penalty into court, or, if 
imposed on motion, an order directing payment to the movant of 
some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs 
incurred as a direct result of the violation. 152 
This articulation retains much of the current Rule's wording. For 
example, sanctions may encompass monetary awards of attorneys' 
fees that the infraction imposes on the other party. 153 Nonetheless, 
there are several significant changes. 
Most important, the text, before mentioning financial sanctions, 
146. The 1983 version did provide that an appropriate sanction "may include an order to 
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred" because of 
the paper's filing, "including a reasonable attorney's fee." FED. R. C1v. P. 11. This language, 
especially the provision regarding attorney's fees, has been the source of considerable difficulty. 
See infra note 176 and accompanying text. 
147. FED. R. C1v. P. l l(c)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
148. See William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 
104 F.R.D. 181, 201 (1984). Numerous judges have looked to Judge Schwarzer for guidance 
in applying Rule 11. See National Assoc. of Gov't Employees Inc. v. National Fed'n of Fed. 
Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 223-24 (1988). 
149. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 
(1991); White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684 (10th Cir. 1990); Doering v. Union 
County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1988). 
150. Pointer, supra note 89. 
151. Miller, supra note 89. Several members stated that circuit courts could employ the 
notion under the Committee's formulation. Colloquy between Judge Pointer and Judge 
Phillips, Advisory Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 24, 1991). Another 
important suggestion, offered by Judge Pointer, which the Committee rejected was the concept 
of "remedial measures" that would be' less onerous than sanctions. Id. 
152. FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
153. FED. R. C1v. P. 11. 
882 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:855 
states that "the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a 
nonmonetary nature."154 The text also explicitly provides for mone-
tary penalties to be paid to the court155 and for payment of some or all 
of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses that directly 
result from the violation. 156 
The two sentences defining and elaborating "appropriate sanc-
tion" reflect the Committee's intent to stress Rule 11 's deterrent pur-
pose, to encourage courts' use of nonmonetary sanctions while 
discouraging reliance on financial awards, and to deemphasize the 
Rule's compensatory goal. The Committee's language choices-use 
of "shall be limited," "is sufficient," and the express inclusion of 
"deter" in the first, definitional sentence-illustrate the four objec-
tives.157 The goals also are demonstrated in the second, elaborative 
sentence by employment of "may consist of," "or include," and 
"monetary penalty"; use of "directives of a nonmonetary nature" and 
its placement before "monetary penalties"; permitting awards of par-
tial fees; and mentioning compensation. 158 
The only word choice that may depart from the objectives is the 
provision for paying movants "some or all of the reasonable attorneys' 
fees and other costs incurred," rather than "costs, including attor-
ney's fees," language employed in earlier drafts of the proposal. 159 
Yet even that phrasing is consistent, because courts authorized to 
award "some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees" 160 could assess 
less than the fees in fact sustained, especially by recognizing that rea-
sonable fees need not be the ones actually incurred. 161 
iii. Committee Note/Deliberations 
The Committee Note and the Committee's deliberations confirm 
154. FED. R. C1v. P. l l(c)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
155. Id. This would clarify confusion as to whether current Rule 11 authorizes such 
penalties. Compare Blue v. United States Dep't of Anny, 914 F.2d 525, 548 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(district court erred in imposing penalty of nearly $38,000 for court expenses), cert. denied, 111 
S. Ct. 1580 (1991) with Cannon v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 116 F.R.D. 243, 244 (N.D. Ill. 
1987) (threat to impose sanctions payable to court for wasting judicial resources). See also 
Eisenberg v. University of New Mexico, 936 F.2d 1131, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 1991) (distirct 
court may impose sanction in form of fine for court's time). 
156. FED. R. C1v. P. 1 l(c)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
157. Id.; see supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
158. Id. 
159. Compare FED. R. C1v. P. 1 l(c)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1991) with FED. R. C1v. P. 
1 l(c) (Proposed Draft May 24, 1991). Cf FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (amount of reasonable expenses, 
including reasonable attorneys' fee). 
160. FED. R. C1v. P. 11(c)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1991) (emphasis added). 
161. See, e.g., In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 523 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 
1607 (1991); White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 683-84 (10th Cir. 1990). 
1992) RECONSIDERING RULE 11 883 
the propositions above while affording valuable additional insights 
into its thinking. Indeed, the Committee enunciated these four objec-
tives more clearly and emphatically during its discussions than in the 
proposal's text or the Note. 
a. Emphasis of Deterrence 
The Committee indicated in many ways that deterrence is Rule 
1 l's principal goal. 162 The Note frequently mentions this deterrent 
purpose, explaining that an appropriate sanction is one which will 
deter future improper conduct by the person or by others similarly 
situated. 163 The need to emphasize deterrence was a constant refrain 
in Committee deliberations. Typical were the remarks of several 
members that an appropriate sanction would be one which is suffi-
cient to deter. 164 
b. Deemphasis of Compensation 
The committee intended to discourage the use of Rule 11 for 
compensation. The Reporter stated that a major goal was to "refocus 
sanctioning from compensation to deterrence."165 Some members 
similarly suggested that the Committee encourage judges to deem-
phasize compensation when choosing sanctions. 166 
c. Deemphasis of Monetary Sanctions 
The Committee stated in numerous ways that courts should 
reduce significantly the number and magnitude of monetary sanc-
tions, particularly awards of attorneys' fees, imposed under current 
Rule 11. During Committee deliberations, most members acknowl-
edged that many judges had treated attorneys' fees as the sanction of 
first resort under the 1983 amendment, assessing awards that were 
excessive in both number and size. Judge William Bertelsman and 
Judge Mariana Pfaelzer mentioned the "widespread belief at the 
beginning" of Rule 11 's implementation that the "normal sanction 
was to be fee shifting,"167 while Justice Michael Zimmerman 
162. This was the 1983 amendment's primary goal; the Supreme Court stamped its 
imprimatur on that idea in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990). 
163. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
164. Pointer, supra note 89; Winter, supra note 115; Justice Michael D. Zimmerman, Utah 
Supreme Court, Statement at Advisory Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 23-24, 
1991). 
165. Professor Paul Carrington, Advisory Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 23-
24, 1991). 
166. Id.; Holbrooke, supra note 89; Pfaelzer, supra note 89. 
167. Judge William 0. Bertelsman, E.D. Ky., Statement at Advisory Committee Meeting, 
Washington, D.C. (May 23-24, 1991); Pfaelzer, supra note 89. 
884 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:855 
remarked on the "national perception that fee shifting is the primary 
sanction and the sanction of first choice." 168 An important theme in 
the meetings was the willingness of courts to compensate and shift 
fees, thereby fostering the Rule's overuse and potential chilling 
effect. 169 
Several members suggested that courts be urged to limit imposi-
tion of these sanctions. Judge Pointer stated that the Committee was 
"trying to contract the fee-shifting possibilities," Justice Zimmerman 
observed that no one defends fee-shifting as the principal sanction, 
and Judge Bertelsman wanted the Committee to "make clear that 
sanctions should not primarily be" attorneys' fees. 170 
The Committee sought to restrict rather than eliminate the 
courts' reliance on compensation, monetary sanctions, and fee-shift-
ing. Particularly telling is the Note's statement that judges may 
award fees and that financial assessments sometimes can be the most 
efficacious deterrent. 171 Another sign of the Committee's intent to 
circumscribe, yet retain, such sanctioning is textual provision for pay-
ment of "some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees" that movants 
incur as a "direct result of the violation." 172 The Note similarly pros-
cribes reimbursement for services attributable to delay in seeking 
sanctions, states that partial compensation may sufficiently deter 
those with modest resources, and admonishes courts about fee shifting 
that contravenes the requirements governing statutory fee awards, 
exemplified by Christiansburg Garment. 173 
168. Zimmerman, supra note 164. 
169. Carrington, supra note 165; James Powers, Esq., Statement at Advisory Committee 
Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 23-24, 1991); Pfaelzer, supra note 89. 
170. Bertelsman, supra note 167; Pointer, supra note 89; Zimmerman, supra note 164. 
171. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
172. Id. These limitations apparently were derived from other sources. Many courts 
applying the 1983 amendment had stated that reasonable fees need not be actual fees and had 
imposed on movants the duty to mitigate their expenses. See, e.g., Napier v. Thirty or More 
Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1093-94 (3d Cir. 1988); Dubisky v. Owens, 849 F.2d 
1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988). 
173. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991); see 
also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). Many courts applying the 
1983 amendment had made "ability to pay" an important equitable consideration. See, e.g., In 
re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); White v. 
General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 685 (10th Cir. 1990). Some critics have argued that 
courts should not rely on Rule 11 to require civil rights plaintiffs to pay the attorneys' fees of 
defendants, because that would contravene the idea that prevailing plaintiffs in these cases 
normally are entitled to fees and prevailing defendants ordinarily are not. See Brief for 
Amicus Curiae Public Citizen Litigation Group, Business Guides v. Chromatic 
Communication Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991) (No. 89-1500). The Advisory Committee Note 
adds that payments to other litigants for reducing their injuries may be preferable to fines 
payable to courts, especially for violations of the improper purpose clause. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 
advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). It is important to understand the 
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d. Emphasis of Nonmonetary Sanctions 
The Committee encouraged increased use of nonmonetary sanc-
tions in several ways. The Note expressly observes that courts have 
available many sanctions: striking the violative paper; issuing a warn-
ing, reprimand, or censure; demanding participation in certain educa-
tional programs; requiring that fines be paid to the court; and 
referring attorneys to disciplinary authorities. 174 The Committee did 
not place this material in the text; however, the Note states that "for 
emphasis, [the text] does specifically note that sanctions may be non-
monetary as well as monetary."175 This decision seems curious, as 
some members recognized that attorneys' fees became the sanction of 
choice because the term appears in current Rule 11 's text.176 Judge 
Pointer, the proposal's principal drafter, explained that he simply 
deemed it inappropriate to place the Note's comprehensive listing in 
the text of a Rule.177 
iv. Miscellaneous Considerations Primarily Related 
to Appropriate Sanctions 
a. "Factors" in the Committee Note 
The Note similarly states that the Committee did not attempt to 
specify in the Rule's text the factors that courts should consider when 
"deciding whether to order a sanction or what sanctions would be 
appropriate in the circumstances."178 Instead, the Note enumerates 
many factors that could apply in a particular case: 
Whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it 
was part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated event; whether the 
person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation; whether 
it was intended to injure; what effect it had on the litigation process 
in time or expense; whether the responsible person is trained in the 
law; what amount, given the financial resources of the responsible 
person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same 
case; what amount is needed to deter similar activity in other 
litigation. . . .1 79 
substantial qualifications being imposed. First, monetary awards are to be used in the service 
of deterrence. Second, violations of the improper purpose requirement are the worst case 
scenarios. 
174. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991) (citing 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION§ 42.3 (2th ed. 1985)). 
175. Id.; see also FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
176. Bertelsman, supra note 167; Pfaelzer, supra note 89; Zimmerman, supra note 164; see 
also supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text. 
177. Pointer, supra note 89. The Committee seemed to defer to Judge Pointer's views. 
178. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
179. Id. It is unclear why the Note states that courts may consider the factors in resolving 
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Although this guidance may not help judges resolve alleged Rule 
violations, the factors should assist the judiciary select appropriate 
sanctions. 180 Several specific factors, such as whether those responsi-
ble have legal training or the ability to pay, are the types of factors 
that courts should consider in choosing a sanction. 181 Most of the 
factors imply that judges should tailor sanctions' severity to the seri-
ousness of the violative behavior and to the harm caused to courts or 
parties. Absent express prescription of this approach and in the pres-
ence of other factors, such as the potential for chilling legitimate liti-
gation, 182 judges may be reluctant to apply these factors, which 
remain ambiguous and could be misconstrued. 
A few factors listed may present difficulty. For instance, 
"whether the person has engaged in similar [improper] conduct in 
possible Rule violations. The standards specifically articulated in proposed Rule l l(b)(l)-(3) 
should be the principal, if not the exclusive, decisional criteria. Several factors listed in the 
Note, such as the amount needed to deter, are obviously irrelevant or should be so treated. 
"Whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation" should be irrelevant, 
because Rule violations should be based only on behavior in the instant case. Id.; see also Blue 
v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 547 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 
(1991). 
180. Most of the remaining factors are much more relevant to choosing appropriate 
sanctions than to possible Rule violations. For example, whether the improper behavior "was 
intended to injure [and] what effect it had on the litigation process in time and expense" are 
quite relevant to ascertaining proper sanctions but of limited relevance to Rule violations. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
Insofar as any of the factors may be properly applied in discerning whether the Rule was 
contravened, it is unclear precisely how this can be most effectively achieved, particularly how 
the factors are to mesh with the decisional criteria prescribed in proposed Rule l l(b)(l)-(3). 
For instance, whether the improper behavior "was part of a pattern of activity," id., is unclear: 
are two infractions sufficient or must there be five, and is their relative severity relevant? It 
also may be difficult to measure the effect that the conduct had on the "litigation process in 
time or expense." Id. This entails questions involving the severity of the violation, how it 
affected the litigation process, and the calculation of the temporal and monetary costs. 
In the final analysis, it may simply be preferable to include in the text clearly delineated 
standards, which, if violated, support the imposition of sanctions. This would provide notice, 
due process, and clarity. 
181. The reference to legal training and the limited responsibilities that the proposed Rule 
imposes on represented parties substantially reduce the significant obligations that the 
Supreme Court imposed on them in Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 
111 S. Ct. 922 (1991). See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
182. This has been one of the principal criticisms levelled at Rule 11 since its 1983 
amendment. See supra notes 16-17, 23, 28, 64 and accompanying text. Recent cases that 
speak to chilling are Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 
681 (1991); Jones v. Westside-Urban Health Ctr., 760 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (S.D. Ga. 1991); 
Tutton v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 733 F. Supp. 1113, 1119 (N.D. Tex. 1990); see also 
Tobias, supra note 18, at 110-16. Additional equitable factors that courts apply include the 
offender's experience and ability, the seriousness of the violation, and the extent to which there 
was bad faith or malice. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 524-25 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 685 (10th Cir. 1990); 
Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195-97 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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other litigation" should have limited relevance and could be prejudi-
cial.183 Courts may also experience difficulty determining whether 
challenged behavior "was part of a pattern of activity" 184 or "was 
intended to injure" 185 and "what effect it had on the litigation process 
in time or expense." 186 
The Note affords few broader suggestions. For example, the 
Rule provides little guidance for situations in which multiple factors 
are present, although the Note alludes to that possibility. 187 The fail-
ure to set priorities among the factors or to recommend ways of valu-
ing and perhaps balancing them, especially when in conflict, could 
complicate judicial efforts to select appropriate sanctions. 188 
b. Liability for Sanctions 
The proposal's text provides that judges "shall impose an appro-
priate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties determined 
... to be responsible for a violation."189 The Note instructs that a 
paper's signer assumes a non-delegable duty to the court and usually 
will be the person sanctioned, 190 although judges may need to sanc-
tion others occasionally in addition to, but rarely instead of, the 
signer. 191 The Note adds that the change is meant to remove limita-
tions in current Rule 11 which the Supreme Court had interpreted to 
183. Past improper conduct may be relevant as an indicator that past sanctions were 
inadequate to deter such conduct in the future. See, e.g., White, 908 F.2d at 685; Doering, 857 
F.2d at 197 n.6. "Repeat offenses" certainly have been treated as relevant to criminal law 
sentencing, although they have been hedged with procedural protections. See WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 25.1 (1985). 
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). The 
contrast, "or an isolated event," provides some assistance, although it is unclear how many 
infractions constitute a pattern and whether their relative severity is relevant. 
185. Id. Courts could become embroiled in numerous difficult determinations of credibility 
in applying this factor. Moreover, negligently inflicted harm could have effects equally serious 
as intentionally perpetrated harm. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. ("[A]ll of these [factors] may in a particular case be proper considerations."). 
188. For instance, should a violator's inability to pay and vulnerability to chilling outweigh 
the "need to deter that person from repetition in the same case [or] to deter similar activity in 
other litigation"? Id. Correspondingly, should the improper behavior's effect on the litigation 
process override these factors? See id. 
Despite the inherent difficulties of affording particularized guidance for resolving fact-
specific situations, greater specificity would be desirable. Cf Carl Tobias, Of Public Funds and 
Public Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants 
in Adminstrative Proceedings, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 906 (1982) (more factors do not necessarily 
yield better decisions); see also supra note 188 and accompanying text; infra notes 243, 302 and 
accompanying text. 
189. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
190. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
191. Id. 
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proscribe awards against the signer's law firm. 192 The modification 
seems fairer, because it would fix liability on those actually responsi-
ble. The change should encourage compliance by a broader spectrum 
of responsible actors, such as partners and law firms, that might 
otherwise avoid liability by, for instance, having salaried associates 
sign and be responsible for papers. 193 
A related provision states that monetary sanctions may be 
assessed against represented parties only for violations of the 
improper purpose clause. 194 The Note explains that this limitation 
would avoid potential difficulties under the Rules Enabling Act, 19~ but 
that it would not restrict judicial power to impose sanctions having 
collateral monetary implications. 196 This prohibition, and other cau-
tions in the Note, 197 respond to concerns about courts' authority to 
shift fees. 198 
c. Awards for Prevailing on Sanctions Motions 
Rule 1 l(c) also provides that judges may award to prevailing liti-
gants the reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees incurred in filing or 
resisting Rule 11 motions. 199 Judge Pointer indicated that recovery of 
these costs should be the "norm. "200 Assessing these expenses seems 
fair. Moreover, the possibility of recovering the costs for opposing 
motions should provide several benefits. Because plaintiffs are 
targeted more than defendants, but three-quarters of sanctions 
motions are denied, parties' invocation of Rule 11 may become more 
192. Id.; see also Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456, 459 
(1989); The change reinstitutes what several members stated was the intent of the 1983 
drafters. Advisory Committee Meeting, Washington D.C. (May 23, 1991). Accord Pavelic, 
110 S. Ct. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
193. The problem was mentioned during the Committee's deliberations. 
194. FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
195. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Note (Proposed Official Draft 1991) (citing 
Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991)); see also Rules 
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1989); Chambers v. Nasco, 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991); 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). 
196. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
Examples are "dismissal of a claim, preclusion of a defense [and] preparation of amended 
pleadings." Id. 
197. "In cases brought under statutes providing for fees to be awarded to prevailing parties, 
the court should not employ cost-shifting under this rule in a manner that would be 
inconsistent with the standards that govern the statutory award of fees, such as Christiansburg 
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978)."; see also supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
198. See, e.g., Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2141-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Business Guides, 
111 S. Ct. at 935 (Kennedy J., dissenting); see also supra note 173. 
199. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
200. Pointer, supra note 89. 
1992] RECONSIDERING RULE 11 889 
balanced, 201 while the Rule's overuse could be reduced. In numerous 
situations, however, the provision may afford an additional incentive 
to seek sanctions and could engender some satellite litigation. Liti-
gants also should be able to defend against Rule 11 motions without 
incurring additional expense, as the Fourth Circuit recently 
observed. 202 
d. Mandatory Sanctioning 
The proposal retains mandatory sanctioning. The Committee 
seemed concerned that substituting "may" for "shall" would send the 
wrong signal. Because the principal problems with sanctions' imposi-
tion since 1983 have involved judicial application, reversion to a dis-
cretionary standard would be inconsequential. For instance, judges 
who levied large sanctions against civil rights plaintiffs under the cur-
rent Rule could impose similar awards by exercising this newly 
articulated discretion. 
v. Critical Assessment of Guidance on Appropriate Sanctions 
The Committee's guidance for choosing an appropriate sanction 
typifies much of the proposal. 203 Those suggestions respond to certain 
criticisms of current Rule 11. For example, the recommendations 
should reduce chilling by discouraging courts' reliance on financial 
sanctions, as they achieve some deterrence by prescribing monetary 
sanctions, when indicated. 204 The guidance may be deficient primar-
ily because it is ambiguous and depends too much on judicial discre-
tion while remaining insufficiently responsive to several additional 
problems posed by the existing Rule, such as inconsistency and satel-
lite litigation. 205 
The phrase "appropriate sanction" is illustrative. This unclear, 
open-ended concept on which courts would train their discretion can 
be inconsistently interpreted and applied differently in similar situa-
tions, fostering the Rule's overuse, satellite litigation, and chilling eff-
fects. Equally instructive is the Note's pronouncement that judicial 
power to award attorneys' fees is retained and that monetary assess-
ments may be the most efficacious deterrent in certain situations.206 
Judges exercising their discretion in effectuating this guidance could 
201. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 113, at 9-10. 
202. Blue v. United States Dep't of Anny, 914 F.2d 525, 548-49 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). 
203. See infra notes 234-55 and accompanying text. 
204. See supra notes 143-45, 152-77 and accompanying text. 
205. See infra notes 234-47 and accompanying text. 
206. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
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conclude that fee shifting would be the best means of deterring abuse. 
Indeed, they may be correct. Unfortunately, such sanctions will most 
effectively deter those lawyers and litigants who have the least power 
and resources, chilling their ability to bring suit. 201 
c. Sanctions on the Court's Initiative 
Proposed Rule 11 ( c) includes several provisions that govern 
sanctioning on the court's initiative. 208 The subdivision retains 
courts' power to sanction sua sponte but imposes several new require-
ments on judges while according targets greater procedural protec-
tion. 209 Courts must issue orders to show cause and afford reasonable 
opportunity for responses before levying sanctions.210 Rule ll(c) 
proscribes assessment of monetary penalties after litigants voluntarily 
dismiss or settle a case, because parties should not subsequently have 
to confront an unexpected sanction, which could influence their deci-
sionmaking.211 Although litigants who withdraw offending assertions 
have no safe harbor after judges issue orders to show cause, courts 
should consider the withdrawal in choosing sanctions.212 These pro-
cedures respond to criticism that judges now possess excessive flexibil-
ity to sanction on their own initiative and that some judges abuse this 
discretion.213 The requirements should be an improvement, although 
they may not suffice for parties with scarce resources. 
d. Additional Miscellaneous Considerations 
Numerous additional indicia of Committee intent are in the pro-
posal's text, the accompanying Note and the Committee's delibera-
tions. For example, Rule 1 l(a), titled "Signature," retains several 
provisions of the existing Rule214 and deletes others as unnecessary.21s 
However, these are clarifying measures. Correspondingly, one para-
graph in the Note states that Rule 11 is not the sole source for con-
207. See supra notes 16, 22-23, 28, 64 and accompanying text. 
208. See FED. R. C1v. P. 1 l(c)(l)(B), 2(A)-(B) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
209. Id.; FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
210. FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c)(I) (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
211. FED. R. C1v. P. I l(c)(2)(B) (Proposed Official Draft 1991); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 
(Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
212. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
213. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 6, at 501-03; Tobias, supra note 11, at 169-70; see also 
supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
214. The proposed Rule retains the requirements for signatures on papers and that 
unsigned papers be stricken, unless the lawyer or litigant who failed to sign them promptly 
does so after being notified. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed 
Official Draft 1991 ). 
215. The note deletes provisions regarding the effect of answers given under oath and 
stating that the signing of a paper is a certification that the signer has read it. Id. 
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trolling inappropriate presentations to courts, and lists a catalog of 
options,216 while another paragraph provides that the Rule's terms 
only govern material presented to courts.217 This guidance could cor-
rect the tendencies of numerous parties and some judges to consider 
Rule 11 as the exclusive sanctioning provision in the Federal Rules or 
to invoke it in disputes more properly addressed under the discovery 
rules. 218 During the seven hours that the Committee discussed the 
proposal, the members articulated numerous specific ideas. Because 
several broad themes and dynamics characterize and contribute to an 
understanding of the proposal, they warrant additional treatment 
here. 
One pervasive theme in Committee deliberations was a concerted 
effort to respond to criticism of the current Rule. Many members 
expressly stated that they were attempting to be responsive, and many 
suggestions testify to this. For instance, concern about chilling, satel-
lite litigation, and judicial economy underlay inclusion of safe harbors 
and efforts to limit reliance on monetary sanctions.219 
The Committee concomitantly attempted to strike appropriate 
balances and to accommodate all interests that the proposal would 
affect. 220 One example was the repeated refrain that the Committee 
"send the right message"221 about deterring litigation abuse. Imposi-
tion of the continuing duty and retention of mandatory sanctions and 
monetary awards manifest ongoing substantial concern over abuse. 
Contrasting these with provisions for safe harbors, increased proce-
dural protection, and reduced fee shifting, illustrates Committee 
efforts to reach fair, feasible compromises and to be responsive to all 
affected. 
A third theme was the Committee's attempt to accord district 
courts substantial discretion. A number of members argued for the 
retention of such discretion, apparently believing that they should 
216. The Note lists fee shifting statutes, contempt, impositions of sanctions, awards of 
expenses or directing remedial actions under other rules or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988), and tort 
actions for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. See also infra notes 271-75 and 
accompanying text. 
217. Rule 11 does not cover papers involving disclosure and discovery that are not so filed 
but may be served on litigants, although Rules 26 and 37 govern those papers. See FED. R. 
Ctv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (Proposed Official Draft 1991). 
218. See Call for Comments, supra note 17, at 345; see also KRITZER, supra note 53, at 5 
(noting that discovery abuse remains a prominent reason for Rule 11 activity). 
219. See supra notes 114-22, 143-77 and accompanying text. The Committee also relied 
heavily on the data that it had collected. 
220. Pointer, supra note 89; Miller, supra note 89. 
221. Judge Wayne D. Brazil, Mag. N.D. Cal., Statement at Advisory Committee Meeting, 
Washington, D.C. (May 23-24, 1991); Holbrooke, supra note 89. 
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defer to judges who must enforce the Federal Rules. 222 Examples are 
courts' great discretion to select appropriate sanctions and considera-
ble discretion to resolve Rule 11 motions. 223 Moreover, the deferen-
tial standard of appellate review retained affords trial judges much 
discretion vis-a-vis circuit courts. 224 A narrower theme of the Com-
mittee's work is that Rule 11 not be considered a cure for every ill 
that plagues the litigation process. Several members mentioned the 
availability of substantive tort law remedies, namely abuse of process 
and malicious prosecution. 22s 
The dynamics of Committee deliberations enhance comprehen-
sion of its efforts. 226 Judge Pointer, individual members, and the 
group as a whole constantly attempted to reach consensus, voting 
only when necessary. Members displayed little reluctance to criticize 
or to express their opinions forthrightly, although public attendance 
could have compromised candor.227 The Committee frequently rea-
soned by example to develop proposals that would work in prac-
tice. 228 Moreover, the members were acutely sensitive to the 
limitations of employing certain phraseology to convey the exact 
meaning desired. For instance, the observation that using "reason-
ably calculated" connoted "estimated" led to its replacement in defin-
ing an appropriate sanction. 229 
The Committee's work also demonstrates difficulties inherent in 
"drafting by committee."23° For example, at several decisional 
points, there was insufficient time for the type of careful reflection 
that complex rule drafting invariably demands,231 notwithstanding 
222. Miller, supra note 89; Winter, supra note 115. 
223. See supra notes 143-88 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. 
225. Judge Robert E. Keeton, D. Mass., Statement at Advisory Committee Meeting, 
Washington, D.C. (May 23-24, 1991); Pointer, supra note 89; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET 
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§§ 119-21 (5th ed. 1984). 
226. See supra note 2. 
227. This fundamental tension in modern administrative government is witnessed in the 
Freedom oflnfonnation Act, s u.s.c. § 552(b)(S) (1988); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS§ 8.3.2e (1985). 
228. Committee discussion of the safe harbors provisions considered timing, the form of 
notice, possible responses, cost, and benefits among other factors. 
229. Judge Pointer employed "reasonably calculated" in preparing a draft on the evening of 
May 23 for Committee consideration on the morning of May 24. Cj supra notes 88-90 and 
accompanying text (similar debate and word choice); see also infra text accompanying note?. 
230. There is virtually no work on collaborative writing in law. But see Bari Burke, Legal 
Writing (Groups) at the University of Montana: Professional Voice Lessons in a Communal 
Context, 52 MONT. L. REV. 373 (1991); see also ANDREA LUNSFORD & LISA EDE, PLURAL 
AUTHORS/SINGULAR TEXTS (1990) (work on collaborative writing in other fields). 
231. This is somewhat impressionistic, but there simply seemed to be inadequate time to 
think through the type of complex, polycentric problems that Rule 11 poses, to explore fully 
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Committee efforts to surmount this complication. 232 An ironic 
dynamic was that appellate judges and professors, rather than district 
judges and practitioners, dominated Committee discussions, in that 
district judges must apply the Rules and lawyers must practice under 
them. Judge Pointer was one exception, and, as Chair, he ran the 
meetings fairly and expeditiously, affording everyone full opportunity 
to speak and even participating in the overnight drafting of pertinent 
terminology. 
C. Critical Assessment of Proposed Rule 11 
1. ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS 
It is difficult to evaluate the Committee's proposal. The sugges-
tions are the first steps in a protracted rule-revision process, and the 
recommendations attempt to rectify many problems created by a very 
controversial Rule. These difficulties can be ascribed more to Rule 11 
as applied than as written, a circumstance that the proposal affects 
only tangentially. 
Projecting how courts will effectuate clear, let alone ambiguous, 
guidance is problematic. There could be slippage between the Com-
mittee's intent in drafting the proposal and the judiciary's implemen-
tation of the amendment adopted. These complications may well 
accompany numerous untested concepts. Some difficulties similar to 
those experienced since 1983 and certain new problems, which defy 
precise prediction, will attend enforcement. Indeed, formulating 
definitive conclusions is impossible, because the suggestions' efficacy 
will depend on courts' exercise of their discretion to effectuate them. 
Additional factors complicate accurate prediction. One difficulty 
is the selection and application of appropriate analytical parameters. 
For instance, should the relevant criterion be how substantially the 
proposal would reduce Rule 11 's invocation, monetary sanctions, 
chilling effects, or litigation abuse? Correspondingly, should the 
potential benefits and disadvantages of the recommendations be 
viewed from the perspective of judges, litigants, or lawyers? 
Notwithstanding such problems, some preliminary assessments 
can and should be posited, principally by considering the proposal in 
light of the major difficulties that Rule 11 has posed for courts, par-
all feasible solutions, commit ideas to paper in ways that would prove workable, and let 
concepts "settle." See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE 
L.J. 65 ( 1983). 
232. See, e.g., supra notes 219-29; infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. I do not mean 
to be critical. In the final analysis, it may be impossible to write first drafts that effectively 
serve as final drafts for issues as difficult as those Rule 11 presents. 
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ties, and attorneys since 1983. That proposal should respond in cer-
tain ways, but may be unresponsive or only partly responsive to the 
complications presented by judicial discretion, ambiguity, inconsis-
tency, satellite litigation, overuse, and chilling effects. 233 
2. THE PROPOSAL AND THE PROBLEMS OF CURRENT RULE 11 
a. Judicial Discretion 
The Committee's suggestions respond to difficulties created by 
placing substantial judicial discretion in trial courts. For instance, 
textual provision for sanctioning on the court's own initiative will 
limit district judges' discretion to invoke Rule 11 and should concom-
itantly reduce chilling effects. 234 
Numerous aspects of the proposal will be unresponsive to the 
problems that discretion poses. For example, retaining deferential 
appellate review leaves trial courts great discretion. 235 Simply 
restricting this discretion may not be responsive to other difficulties 
that discretion or Rule 11 creates. For instance, mandatory sanction-
ing has required that judges who considered sanctions unnecessary 
impose them anyway, which could unnecessarily harm lawyers' 
reputations. 
The recommendations are partly responsive to the complications 
that discretion entails. For example, the guidance for selecting an 
appropriate sanction limits discretion to shift attorneys' fees, but that 
phrase requires the exercise of much discretion. 236 Provision for a 
number of procedures similarly cabins discretion, although judges 
must invoke discretion to choose specific procedures in many cases.237 
b. Ambiguity 
The suggestions should be responsive to some problems created 
by ambiguity in the current Rule. A general example is the prescrip-
tion of more explicit procedural protections than were in that Rule 
233. There are other complications, such as incivility and problematic informal Rule 11 
activity, but those listed in the text have been most important. There also is a subtle 
distinction between most of the complications and the difficulties they create. For instance, the 
problem of ambiguity can lead to inconsistency and chilling. 
234. See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text. 
235. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. 
236. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra notes 112-42 and accompanying text. The selection of some procedures, 
such as those involving factual assertions, must be left to case-by-case determination. Other 
choices, such as ones implicating the precise nature of targets' notice and opportunity to 
respond and courts' justifications of their sanctioning decisions may. Nonetheless, the Rule 
should explicitly provide, for example, that procedures be tailored to the violation's perceived 
severity. See supra text following note 130. 
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and than numerous judges had afforded. 238 These provisions should 
reduce alleged procedural irregularities and should combat related 
problems, such as satellite litigation and chilling effects. 
The proposal is unresponsive in certain respects. It retains a few 
unclear concepts, such as "appropriate sanctions" and "reasonable 
attorney's fees,"239 and incorporates several untested ideas which 
could be confusing, such as "safe harbors" and the Note's "fac-
tors."240 The proposal replaces relatively clear concepts, such as good 
faith, with ambiguous ones, namely frivolousness. 241 Mere clarifica-
tion also might not alleviate other complications which ambiguity or 
Rule 11 presents. For instance, elucidating the existence of a continu-
ing duty by expressly prescribing it will foster satellite litigation and 
chilling.242 However, the recommendations are partly responsive to 
the problems that ambiguity poses. For example, the Note clarifies 
Rule 11 by specifying many factors to guide the courts, but leaves 
unexplained how they inform the choice of an appropriate sanction. 243 
c. Inconsistency 
Inconsistent interpretation of Rule 11 's terms and its inconsistent 
application in similar factual circumstances are closely related to 
ambiguity. The proposal will reduce some inconsistancy. For 
instance, clarification of procedures should limit inconsistent protec-
tions that judges have provided. 
The proposal could be deficient in numerous ways. For example, 
new concepts, such as safe harbors, can be inconsistently construed 
and differently applied in analogous factual contexts, prompting satel-
lite litigation and chilling. 244 Increasing consistency alone may be 
unresponsive to other difficulties with the Rule. For instance, making 
tiny portions of a paper violative will rectify conflicting interpreta-
tions but could foster overuse and chilling. 245 
Yet, the proposal also is partly responsive. The guidance for 
selecting an appropriate sanction should limit the imposition of dis-
similar sanctions in like factual situations. Nonetheless, the many fac-
tors pertinent to exercise of courts' discretion and differing judicial 
238. See supra notes 112-42 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra notes 143-89, 199-207 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra notes 114-23, 178-88 and accompanying text. 
241. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. 
242. See supra notes 60-83 and accompanying text. 
243. See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text. 
244. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text. This is similarly true of 
"frivolousness." See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
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opinions as to which sanctions will best achieve Rule 11 's multiple 
purposes could promote disparate sanctioning. 
d. Satellite Litigation 
Ambiguity and inconsistency implicate problems involving satel-
lite litigation attributable to existing Rule 11. Insofar as the proposal 
enhances clarity, satellite litigation over the Rule's meaning should 
decline. The proposal may be unresponsive in other ways; to the 
extent that it incorporates novel precepts or leaves notions imprecise, 
satellite litigation will be a concomitant.246 Much of the proposal will 
be partly responsive. For instance, the reduced likelihood of recover-
ing attorneys' fees should limit satellite litigation, but ambiguity over 
when they could be awarded may not. 247 
e. Overuse 
The current Rule's overuse is linked to ambiguity, inconsistency, 
and satellite litigation. 248 Certain features of the proposal, such as 
requiring that sanctions motions be served separately, should discour-
age Rule ll's invocation,249 but others may not. For example, the 
heightened demands that the continuing duty places on impecunious 
parties will complicate their compliance and might encourage the 
Rule's use. 2so Some elements could be partially responsive. For 
instance, safe harbors should restrict the Rule's formal invocation, 
but the tactical benefits provided might increase informal use. 2s1 
f. Chilling Effects 
The proposal's responsiveness to the chilling that Rule 11 
prompts is derivative of many ideas above. For example, insofar as 
246. Perhaps a "shakedown" period for implementation of any rule revision should be 
considered a fixed cost of amendment. See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankstein Monsters and 
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 
(1979). 
247. See supra notes 143-88, 205-07 and accompanying text. 
248. See supra note 246 and accompanying text; infra note 251 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. 
250. See supra notes 60-83 and accompanying text. 
251. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. Concerns about problematic informal 
Rule 11 activity are so closely related to overuse that textual treatment is unwarranted. For 
example, the requirements for sanctioning on the court's initiative should be responsive to 
criticisms of courts that improperly invoked the Rule in informal contents. See supra notes 23-
24, 208-13 and accompanying text. The proposal is partly responsive to concerns that parties 
and attorneys have informally invoked Rule 11 in inappropriate ways. For instance, although 
safe harbors would regularize certain of this activity, the procedure, especially when joined 
with the continuing duty, could increase improper informal activity. See supra notes 24, 60-83, 
120-22 and accompanying text. 
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the proposal reduces ambiguity, inconsistency, satellite litigation, or 
overuse, chilling should decrease. 252 The escape hatch that safe 
harbors afford may limit chilling of those who wish to pursue novel 
legal theories or close cases. 253 Other components would be unre-
sponsive. For instance, the onerous nature of the continuing duty and 
the command that legal allegations be nonfrivolous will dampen poor 
litigants' enthusiasm. 254 Some constituents would be partly respon-
sive. For example, requirements governing factual assertions that 
clarify the relationships among Rules 8 and 11 and discovery could 
encourage parties who need information, even as the duty of candor 
discourages them. 255 
3. THE BALANCES STRUCK 
The Committee might have struck different, and ostensibly bet-
ter, balances among the various affected interests. For instance, the 
proposal lacks adequate solicitude for the needs of litigants and law-
yers, especially impecunious ones, and is overly deferential to the judi-
ciary. Provisions for the continuing duty, the duty of candor, and 
"nonfrivolous" legal arguments will impose onerous obligations on 
parties and attorneys and could increase judicial workloads. These 
requirements, by expanding the obligations of litigants and lawyers to 
the court, might deter abuse. They may have been a trade-off for per-
mitting safe harbors and for encouraging reduced reliance on mone-
tary sanctions, both of which should limit chilling. 256 Nevertheless, 
an incorrect balance was struck because the proposed Rule will insuf-
ficiently ameliorate the burdens for parties and attorneys, particularly 
poorer ones. 257 
In sum, this descriptive analysis and critical assessment of the 
proposal show that it should be beneficial in some respects, but will be 
partly unresponsive or responsive in more ways, to significant compli-
cations that Rule 11 has created since 1983. Many ideas examined 
above warrant suggestions for the future. 
252. Of course, to the extent that the proposal does not limit those phenomena, the 
potential for chilling will remain. Lingering uncertainty about implementation of guidance for 
selecting appropriate sanctions is illustrative. See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text. 
253. See supra notes 114-19. It may limit, not eliminate, chilling. See supra notes 119-23 
and accompanying text (noting complications safe harbors may entail). 
254. See supra notes 60-83, 88-94 and accompanying text. 
255. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text. 
256. Attachment to Letter, supra note 95, at 2. 
257. For a discussion of other balancing, see supra notes 64, 117-18 and accompanying text. 
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Introductory Consideration of the Rule Revision Process 
Judge Pointer reworked the proposal in light of the Committee's 
recommendations, circulated the revisions to the members who 
approved them, and sent the final changes to the Standing Committee 
for its consideration on June 13, 1991.258 That Committee made some 
modifications in July and sought public comment on the new version 
in August. 259 After the Advisory Committee receives written and oral 
submissions, it will consider that input in deciding additional altera-
tions. The Committee then will forward its suggestions to the Stand-
ing Committee, the. Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court, 
which must approve them; the Supreme Court transmits all proposals 
for change in Federal Rules to Congress before May 1 of any given 
year, and they become effective seven months later, unless Congress 
acts. 260 · 
This lengthy procedure has several important ramifications. 
Even if it proceeds as smoothly as possible, the proposal will not take 
effect until December 1993. The number of steps and entities in the 
process means that there should be ample· opportunity for public com-
ment. Substantial modification is rather unlikely because nearly all 
official bodies involved, except Congress, have historically deferred to 
the Advisory Committee as the experts with primary responsibility 
for studying the Rules and developing suggested revisions. 261 Thus, 
while the proposal is nascent, it should closely resemble the amend-
ment which ultimately is adopted. 262 
B. Suggestions for Future. Treatment of the Proposal 
1. POSSIBLE REJECTION OF THE PROPOSAL 
The proposal's rejection merits serious consideration in light of 
myriad factors mentioned throughout this paper. These include the 
258. See Attachment to Letter, supra note 95. 
259. Compare FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (Proposed Official Draft 1991) with FED. R. C1v. P. 11 
(Proposed Draft June, 1991) (copy on file with author). 
260. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988); see also Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Amendment of Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, 134 F.R.D. 315 (1991). 
261. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 293, 337-40. But cf. Burbank, supra note 195, at 1018-201 
(documenting increased congressional willingness since 1973 to intercept proposed rules and 
amendments governing evidence and civil, criminal, and appellate procedure); see also Jack H. 
Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. 
L. REV. 673 (1975). 
262. See infra notes 287-89 and accompanying text. But cf. Mullenix, supra note l, at 855 
(predicting that Committee will retreat and abdicate reformulation of Rule 11 to Congress). 
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complications ascribed to Rule 11 since 1983, such.as inconsistency, 
satellite litigation, and chilling effects, which will recur because they 
are inherent or intractable or because the proposal would affect them 
only minimally.263 
A number of the proposal's specific aspects will pose clear diffi-
culties. Most problematic is the continuing duty, which would 
impose burdensome responsibilities on all litigants, but especially 
impecunious ones, potentially .deterring them from pursuing claims. 
The onerous nature of the requirements as to factual and legal asser-
tions is similarly problematic. 
Numerous uncertainties will accompany the proposal's imple-
mentation. Civil rights litigation is illustrative. For the suggestions 
to accommodate the needs of civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, the 
judiciary would have to appreciate the subtleties of their cases and of 
Rule 11. Courts must correctly effectuate the proposal's clear con-
cepts, properly resolve its ambiguities, carefully exercise their consid-
erable discretion, and be sensitive to many intrinsic characteristics of 
civil rights suits and the restraints upon civil rights plaintiffs.264 Even 
were such refined application easier to attain, there would remain sig-
nificant risks, namely the possibility of chilling vali_d litigation. 265 
The time, energy; and money that the proposal's implementation 
will consume may exceed the enormous resources that courts, attor-
neys, and parties have devoted to Rule 11 since 1983.266 Indeed, the 
proposal's promulgation could trigger another decade of inconsistent 
enforcement, satellite litigation, and chilling. 
Retaining Rule 11 in its current or proposed form appears 
unnecessary. The principal difficulty of litigation abuse, which 
prompted the 1983 revision, has been ameliorated. 267 Courts which 
apply the Rule have achieved many additional objectives which 
underlie it. Rule 11 has brought sanctions to the attention of judges 
263. See supra notes 234-55 and accompanying text; see also supra note 246. 
264. Tobias, supra note 6, at 516-17; see also George Cochran, Rule 11: The Road to 
Amendment, 61 MISS. L.J. 5 (1991); Arthur B. LaFrance, Federal Rule I I and Public Interest 
Litigation, 22 VAL. u. L. REV. 331 (1988). 
265. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 517; Cochran, supra note 264, at 6. But cf Melissa L. 
Nelken, Has The Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 
11Sanctions,41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 385 (1990) (urging amendment to lessen chilling effects). 
266. See WILLIAM A. MCCORMACK, JR. ET AL., SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER 
POWERS 21-25 (Gregory P. Joseph et al. eds., 2d ed. 1988); Tobias, supra note 6, at 517. 
267. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 113, at 6-7; William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 
Revisited, IOI HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1014-15 (1988); Tobias, supra note 6, at 514; see also 
THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 67-
69 (1988) (analysis of controversy). 
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and lawyers, making each keenly aware of their significance. 268 The 
Rule has alerted many attorneys to the importance of performing rea-
sonable prefiling inquiries, which has encouraged them to stop and 
think before submitting papers and has discouraged the pursuit of 
frivolous lawsuits.269 
Accomplishing these related goals has been and remains impor-
tant. Nonetheless, judges can achieve these objectives with other effi-
cacious techniques that might involve less disadvantages. Relatively 
effective measures for combatting litigation abuse are Title 28, section 
1927 of the United States Code270 and civil contempt, which protect 
the courts, and tort law remedies, such as abuse of process and mali-
cious prosecution, which protect parties. 271 The recent Supreme 
Court opinion in Chambers v. Nasco 272 greatly expands the possibili-
ties for sanctioning abuse under inherent judicial authority, thus 
reducing the need to sanction through Rule 11. Sanction provisions 
in Rules 16, 26, and 37 treat post-filing, abusive and less reprehensible 
activity; they also decrease the need for sanctioning through Rule 11 
and for the continuing duty.273 
For streamlining the litigation process, another stated purpose of 
the 1983 amendment, vigorous case management has proven more 
efficacious under Rules 16 and 26 than Rule 11 and has fewer deleteri-
ous side effects.274 Judges responding to the FJC survey found the 
expeditious resolution of motions to dismiss and summary judgment, 
Rule 16 pretrial conferences, sanctions under Rules 26 and 37, and 
informal warnings to be more effective than Rule 11. 275 Some evi-
dence even suggests that the current Rule, by reducing civility among 
lawyers and decreasing settlement prospects, may delay dispute reso-
lution. 276 Indeed, the Committee recently urged that revision be pre-
268. See McCORMACK ET AL., supra note 266, at 2, 16, 24; WILLGING, supra note 267, at 
SS-6S. See generally David 0. Stewart, The Year of Sanctioning Litigants, 77 A.B.A. J. 34 
(Aug. 1991) (describing the trend of judges to impose sanction on litigants). 
269. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 113, at 6-7; Schwarzer, supra note 267, at 1014-lS; 
Vairo, supra note 11, at 232-33. 
270. 28 u.s.c. § 1927 (1988). 
271. See supra notes 174, 216, 22S and accompanying text; see also Carl Tobias, Judicial 
Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 9S4 
(1991). 
272. 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991). 
273. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
274. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (noting that greater judicial 
attention to pretrial abuses and sanction imposition should "help to streamline litigation 
process."). 
27S. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 22, § IA, at 1-2; see also INTERIM REPORT, 
supra note 113, at S. 
276. See Tobias, supra note 6, at SIS; cf INTERIM REPORT, supra note 113, at 8-9 (noting 
that although Rule 11 motions often exacerbate contentious and uncooperative behavior 
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mised on the notion that Rule 11 "in its present form, though 
somewhat helpful in controlling and deterring groundless pleadings 
and motions . . . should not be viewed as the primary means to 
accomplish that objective and tends to produce consequences that can 
frustrate the judicial process. "277 
Compensation, which was not a primary objective of the Rule at 
its inception, has since assumed questionable validity as a matter of 
governmental authority. Judges have levied attorneys' fees so often 
that Rule 11 has effectively become a fee-shifting provision. 278 This 
attribute of Rule 11 has been criticized because "allocation of the 
costs accruing from litigation is a matter for the legislature, not the 
courts. "279 Compensation also is dubious on policy and practical 
grounds, as it foments unnecessary satellite litigation and can chill 
legitimate cases, factors the Committee apparently recognized in sug-
gesting the de-emphasis of compensation. 
The need to combat the litigation explosion, which was another 
reason for the 1983 revision, has been and remains highly controver-
sial. It is unclear that such an explosion ever occurred. For example, 
three-quarters of the judges whom the FJC polled observed that 
groundless lawsuits pose minor or no difficulty.280 Insofar as there 
have been frivolous cases which might be characterized as a litigation 
explosion, the present Rule has discouraged some of them. To the 
extent that unwarranted satellite litigation could be denominated part 
of such an explosion, Rule 11 is contributing to it.281 
Some ostensible goals of the current Rule, such as the notion that 
sanctioning through the Federal Rules would fundamentally change 
abusive behavior of lawyers and litigants, have proven unrealistic. 282 
among litigants, the impact on settlement is unclear); see also INTERIM REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 20 (Apr., 1991) 
(Rule 11 sanctions "incivility flash point"). 
277. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 113, at 2. 
278. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 22, § lB, at 9 (finding fee shifting to adversary 
was sanction chosen 82% of time on average in five districts surveyed); see also Mars Steel 
Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989); INTERIM REPORT, supra 
note 113, at 11, 16. 
279. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1576 (1990); accord 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975). 
280. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 22, § 2A, at 2; see also INTERIM REPORT, supra 
note 113, at 5. See generally Tobias, supra note 3, at 287-89 (discussing the litigation 
explosion). 
281. See supra notes 15-17, 41 and accompanying text. Cf. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 
113, at 7-8 (reporting district judges' survey which did not indicate substantial discontent over 
time spent on Rule 11, although motions may have created excessive satellite litigation in some 
courts). 
282. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (noting that original Rule 11 is not 
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Insofar as the existing Rule represents an attempt to eliminate the 
carelessness or neglect which can be ascribed to resource deficiencies, 
that objective seems unattainable and is misguided as a matter of 
policy.283 
This analysis demonstrates that there are few reasons for retain-
ing Rule 11 in its present form. Moreover, much else in this Article 
indicates that the proposal would minimally improve the existing 
Rule. An example alluded to several times is the tendency of the pro-
posal to erode numerous critical purposes of the 1938 Federal Rules, 
such as consistency and merits-based resolution of disputes. 284 The 
analysis shows that the disadvantages of sanctioning under Rule 11 
outweigh the benefits, unless many features of the proposal are modi-
fied. Numerous ideas in this Article suggest that the rule revisors 
should seriously consider Rule 11 's repeal or more substantial amend-
ment than the proposal contemplates. 
The changes that warrant examination are reinstating the pre-
1983 version of Rule 11 or its major components, such as making bad 
faith the standard for Rule violations and the imposition of discretion-
ary sanctions. Other possibilities include the exemption of civil rights 
plaintiffs and lawyers from Rule 11 or from liability for attorneys' fees 
or the imposition of less stringent tests of compliance on them. 285 
Monetary sanctions should be sharply reduced and permitted only in 
cases of egregious litigation abuse and when there is a compelling 
need to deter. 286 
Although the rule revisors should carefully consider these rec-
ommendations, they may not be feasible, as many judges responsible 
for amending the Rules might find the concepts unpalatable. For 
example, the Advisory Committee flatly rejected the reversion to a 
effective in deterring abuses and amendment attempts to correct by encouraging courts to 
sanction abusive conduct); see also supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. 
283. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 73, 271-73 (describing other 
equally effective, less problematic mechanisms for sanctioning behavior). Insofar as Rule 11 
discourages plaintiffs' vindication of constitutional and statutory rights, it frustrates 
congressional intent. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text. 
284. See supra notes 71, 100-10 and accompanying text. The 1938 drafters also sought to 
increase uniformity and to encourage flexible, pragmatic judicial application. See Burbank, 
supra note 7; Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648 
(1981) (recognizing these purposes and the 1983 amendment's erosion of them). 
285. See Nelken, supra note 12, at 404-08 (suggesting emphasis on sufficiency of prefiling 
inquiries, elimination of fee shifting, and caution in Committee's Note about sanctioning civil 
rights plaintiffs). But see Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280-81 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(rejecting a special test for civil rights cases), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987); Tutton v. 
Garland lndep. School Dist., 733 F. Supp. 1113, 1118 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (same). 
286. See McCORMACK ET AL., supra note 266, at 2-3, 24-25; Vairo, supra note 11, at 233. 
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pre-1983 formulation in February, 1991 and again that May.287 Cor-
respondingly, a majority of Supreme Court Justices and most circuit 
and district judges also are concerned with litigation abuse. They 
seem committed to retaining Rule 11 essentially intact, if only as a 
weapon, albeit of limited efficacy, against abuse.288 These phenomena 
were evidenced last Term by the Court's increased amenability to 
finding that lower courts can reach beyond attorneys to their clients 
when imposing sanctions.289 Therefore, it is important to examine 
possible changes in the proposal. 
2. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE IN THE PROPOSAL 
a. Problematic Aspects 
The proposal presents many difficulties that warrant correction 
or amelioration.290 Most significant is the proposal's unresponsive-
ness to the major problems that Rule 11 in its current form creates. 291 
For example, under the proposal district judges would retain exces-
sive discretion; however, this could be limited by stricter appellate 
review.292 Too much ambiguity remains in the proposal, while it 
incorporates new, confusing notions. Such unclear ideas should be 
omitted or replaced with clearer concepts. 293 
Least desirable of the proposal's particulars is the continuing 
duty which will place onerous responsibilities on lawyers and liti-
gants, especially those with little time or money. This duty may have 
a potentially chilling effect. The obligation might afford some bene-
fits, but it will be so burdensome that it should be omitted. 294 
Furthermore, the substitution of "nonfrivolous" for "good faith" 
will impose more onerous demands on attorneys and parties, particu-
larly those who pursue nontraditional or unpopular legal theories or 
those who have scarce resources. The substitution will also replace a 
287. Pointer, supra note 89. 
288. See Tobias, supra note 18, at 124 n.89; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
289. See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991); Business Guides v. 
Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 
112 S. Ct. 1076 (1991); Stewart, supra note 268. 
290. Much examined in this subsection was thoroughly explored in the descriptive analysis 
and the critical assessment in this Article's second Part. The treatment below, therefore, will 
be relatively terse, consisting principally of examples that refer to earlier evaluation. The 
introductory paragraphs consider general problematic and advisable aspects and the 
subsequent paragraphs analyze with greater specificity. 
291. See supra notes 234-55 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra notes 139-42, 223-24, 235. Of course, the proposal might include fewer 
discretionary provisions or circumscribe more narrowly the discretion that remains. But cf 
supra notes 236-37. 
293. See supra notes 178-88, 239-41 and accompanying text. 
294. See supra notes 60-85 and accompanying text. 
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familiar standard with one that courts have applied inconsistently.295 
These disadvantages warrant retaining good faith. The duty of can-
dor will similarly burden impecunious lawyers and litigants. For 
example, lack of access to pertinent data and lack of resources to col-
lect and analyze relevant information, even when accessible, will 
impair attorneys' and litigants' compliance. 296 Because these disad-
vantages would outweigh the benefits, the duty of candor should be 
deleted. 
Mandating that courts scrutinize minuscule fragments of a paper 
for possible infractions parses too finely the idea of a paper and 
assigns attorneys and parties excessively refined duties. 297 If the rule 
revisors determine that an approach premised on the paper as a whole 
lacks adequate rigor, they should employ an approach that considers 
the challenged behavior's severity, or alternatively, a significant por-
tion of, or multiple assertions in, the suspect paper. 298 
Some less troubling specifics remain sufficiently problematic that 
they should be omitted or substantially modified. For instance, the 
abuse of discretion standard for appellate review is too deferential. 299 
Because the detriments, most significantly the potential for chilling, 
are greater than the advantages, more stringent oversight is 
preferable. 
b. Advisable Aspects 
The proposal responds in certain ways to the difficulties that the 
existing Rule poses. For example, the proposal partially limits judi-
cial discretion and might reduce inconsistency, satellite litigation, and 
chilling. 300 A number of specific elements are advisable. Safe harbors 
offer a necessary safety valve, particularly for parties who lack funds 
or wish to pursue nontraditional or unpopular cases, and thus may 
decrease chilling. This could save resources of litigants, lawyers, and 
courts. Although safe harbors may waste resources if improperly 
invoked, judges can combat this problem. 301 
The guidance for selecting an appropriate sanction also is help-
295. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
299. See supra notes 139-42, 235 and accompanying text. 
300. See, e.g .. supra notes 143-88 and accompanying text (limiting discretion); supra notes 
95-96, 100, 112-13, 126-29 and accompanying text (clarifications); supra text accompanying 
notes 243-44 (reduced inconsistency); supra text accompanying notes 245-46 (reduced satellite 
litigation); supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text (reduced chilling). 
301. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (could save or waste resources); supra 
note 136 and accompanying text (ways to combat waste). The Committee also should 
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ful. Achievement of the Committee's four objectives would improve 
sanctioning and could reduce Rule 11 's overuse and chilling effects 
while providing some deterrence. Lingering ambiguity in the gui-
dance provided means, however, that courts may continue relying too 
substantially on monetary assessments. There should be additional 
clarification, stating that financial sanctions must be sharply circum-
scribed. The factors in the Committee Note also should be elaborated 
by, for instance, expressly warning of the potential for chilling legiti-
mate litigation. 302 
Many less significant facets also are advisable, particularly if 
modified. For example, the requirements relating to factual assertions 
clarify the relationships among Rules 8 and 11 and discovery while 
reducing Rule ll's pro-defendant tilt. 303 The requirements, however, 
impose the duty of candor, which should be eliminated.304 Similarly, 
express provisions for increased procedures and for sanctioning on the 
court's initiative should limit inconsistency and chilling effects, 
although both prescriptions warrant refinement. 305 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Advisory Committee, in suggesting Rule 11 's amendment, 
has attempted to respond to criticism. The recommendations may 
not suffice, in part because their efficacy is contingent upon judicial 
implementation. If the new Rule 11 closely resembles the proposal, 
there will be little improvement, and courts, lawyers, and litigants 
could embark on another decade of difficulties similar to those exper-
ienced since 1983. 
The rule revisors should consider rejection or substantial modifi-
cation of the proposal. They should effectuate the suggestions in this 
Article, deleting the proposal's most problematic provisions, clarify-
ing less troubling aspects, and altering other features. If these 
elaborate what is to be included in safe harbor notifications. See supra note 121 and 
accompanying text. 
302. See supra notes 178-82, 187-88 and accompanying text. 
303. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text. 
304. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. 
305. See supra notes 112-42, 208-13 and accompanying text. The procedures governing 
notice and opportunity to respond to sanction motions and judicial justifications for sanctions 
decisionmaking might be refined by prescribing that procedures be tailored to a violation's 
perceived severity. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. This would implement 
current notions of procedural due process. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 
U.S. 532 (1985); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 10-12 
to 10-18 (2d ed. 1988). Certain elements of the proposal are not clearly advisable or 
inadvisable. The Committee's decision to retain the mandatory sanctioning requirement is 
illustrative. See supra text following note 202. 
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changes were instituted, Rule 11 could be significantly improved. The 
Rule might even deter litigation abuse, which was the principal pur-
pose of its 1983 revision, while simultaneously reducing satellite liti-
gation and chilling effects, which are the amendment's foremost 
disadvantages. 
